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“BUT I THOUGHT HE HAD A GUN”
Race and Police Use of Deadly Force
CYNTHIA LEE*
“In the old days, the cops simply shot their black
victims and [planted] a weapon the officers
carried for such emergencies.
Nowadays,
weapons need exist only in the mind of the
policeman in firing position.”
–Les Payne, Journalist for Newsday1

February 4, 1999. About midnight. Amadou Diallo, a 22-yearold immigrant from West Africa, had just come home to his South
Bronx apartment at 1157 Wheeler Avenue after an evening of
selling CDs, hats, gloves, and watches on Fourth Street.
Lingering for just a moment in the vestibule of his apartment
building, Diallo suddenly heard the screeching of tires and saw
four white men with guns pointed straight at him come pouring
out of a car. One of the men yelled something at Diallo. Diallo
reached into his back pants pocket and pulled out his wallet,
offering it to the men in a desperate effort to be left alone. Instead,
he heard someone shout, “Gun!” and the next thing he knew, the
men were firing at him. Stunned, Diallo tried to remain standing
for as long as he could, but the rain of bullets kept coming. Fortyone bullets in all. Nineteen of the forty-one bullets entered his
body, searing him with unbelievable pain. One bullet perforated
his aorta. Another struck his spinal cord. Another his lungs.
Another his liver. Another his spleen. Another his kidney.
* Cynthia Lee is a Professor of Law at the George Washington University School of
Law. This article is adapted from chapter seven in CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE
REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (NYU Press 2003)
and is reprinted with the permission of the author and NYU Press. The author would
like to thank Mike Selmi, Lisa Steele, and Lyn Bates for providing useful feedback on the
material in this essay. The author would also like to thank Billy Santiso and Tom Moir
for providing research assistance on this essay.
1. Les Payne, Black Youths Have Good Reason to March, NEWSDAY, Sept. 6, 1998, at B6.
[1]
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Another his intestines. More than ten bullets struck his legs.
Finally, he couldn’t stand any more and collapsed. Even then the
shooting didn’t stop. Only when it was apparent to all that Diallo
would not be getting up again, the officers finally stopped
shooting. But it was too late for apologies. Amadou Diallo was
dead. And the men who killed him were not robbers, but “New
York’s finest”—police officers from the Street Crimes Unit.2
Police officers are rarely prosecuted for murder because most
fatal police shootings are deemed justified by prosecutors who
decline to prosecute or by grand juries that decline to return
indictments. The Diallo shooting, however, coming shortly on the
heels of the brutal beating and sodomy of Abner Louima, a darkskinned immigrant from Haiti, was too politically charged to be
swept under the rug. The four officers who shot Amadou Diallo
were initially charged with second-degree murder. The charges
were later broadened to give the jury the option of returning a
guilty verdict on lesser charges, including first-degree
manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, and reckless
endangerment.
At trial, the officers claimed Diallo’s death was a justifiable
homicide.3 The officers had been looking for a rape suspect. Diallo
fit the description because he was Black4 and in the neighborhood
where the rape occurred. According to the officers, Diallo brought
the shooting upon himself because of his suspicious movements—
peering up and down the street, retreating into the dimly lit
vestibule, and not responding to the officers’ demands that he stop
and show his hands.5 When Diallo reached into his front pants
pocket and pulled out a black object, the officers thought he had a
gun. One officer started shooting. Hearing the bullets ricocheting
around the vestibule, the other officers thought Diallo was shooting
back. On February 25, 2000, the four officers were acquitted of all
charges by a jury of seven White men, one White woman, and four
Black women.6

2. Narrative derived from Elizabeth Kolbert, The Perils of Safety, NEW YORKER, Mar.
22, 1999, at 50.
3. Amy Waldman, 4 Officers Enter Not-Guilty Pleas to Murder Counts in Diallo Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1999, at A1.
4. I purposely capitalize the words “Black” and “White” to highlight the fact that
Blacks and Whites, like Asian Americans and Latinos, are members of socially
constructed racial categories in American society.
5. Tom Puleo, ‘Justice’ or ‘Shame’: Jury Clears Police Officers in Killing, HARTFORD
COURANT, Feb. 26, 2000, at A1.
6. John J. Goldman, 4 White Officers Are Acquitted in Death of Diallo, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
26, 2000, at A1.
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Introduction
According to a report by the National Institute of Justice and
the Bureau of Justice Statistics, police use force in encounters with
the public in a very small percentage of cases.7 When police do use
force in such encounters, they typically use non-deadly force.8 Even
if police use force relatively infrequently in police-citizen
encounters, police use of deadly force is still an important subject
because of the risk of loss of life in such cases.
It is undisputed that Blacks are disproportionately represented
among the victims of police shootings. In a comprehensive review
of the literature on police use of deadly force, James Fyfe reports
that “every study that has examined this issue [has] found that
blacks are represented disproportionately among those at the wrong
end of police guns.”9 Although Blacks represent approximately
thirteen percent of the population in the United States, in parts of
the country they constitute sixty percent to eight-five percent of the
victims of police shootings.10 On average, Blacks are more than six
times as likely as Whites to be shot by police,11 and in large cities are
killed by police at least three times more often than Whites.12
Latinos (or Hispanics) are about twice as likely as Whites, but only
half as likely as Blacks, to be shot and killed by police.13 There is a
noticeable lack of data regarding police use of force against other
non-Black minorities, such as Asian Americans, Arab Americans,
South Asians, and Native Americans.
However, reports by
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch suggest that, in
relation to their representation in society at large, these other
7. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USE OF FORCE BY POLICE:
OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL DATA 3 (1999).
8. Id. at 4-5.
9. James J. Fyfe, Police Use of Deadly Force: Research and Reform, 5 JUST. Q. 165, 189
(1988).
10. Id.; see also CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR. ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE INST. AT HARVARD
LAW SCH. FOR THE NAT’L ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, BEYOND
THE RODNEY KING STORY: AN INVESTIGATION OF POLICE CONDUCT IN MINORITY
COMMUNITIES 14 (1995); James J. Fyfe, Race and Extreme Police-Citizen Violence, in
READINGS ON POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 173, 176 (James J. Fyfe ed., 1982).
11. Fyfe, supra note 9, at 189-90.
12. SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND CRIME IN
AMERICA 85 (1996) (noting that minorities are “shot and killed three times as often as
whites by police in the big cities . . .”); see also Paul Takagi, A Garrison State in a
“Democratic” Society, in READINGS ON POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE, supra note 10, at
195, 201 (“Black men have been killed by police at a rate some nine to ten times higher
than white men.”).
13. WALKER ET AL., supra note 12, at 92 (citing studies of police shootings in Chicago,
New York City, and Los Angeles).
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minorities are also disproportionately on the receiving end of police
force.14
While widespread consensus exists that racial minorities are
disproportionately represented as victims of police shootings, the
reason for this disproportion is hotly disputed. Most people who
have an opinion on the subject fall within one of two camps which
John Goldkamp, in his study of race and police shootings, calls
“Belief Perspective I” and “Belief Perspective II.”15 Proponents of
Belief Perspective I believe racism on the part of police officers and
police departments results in one trigger finger for racial minorities
and another for Whites.16 According to this view, police officers
intentionally single out racial minorities for harsher treatment.17
Proponents of Belief Perspective II, in contrast, contend that race
does not influence the average police officer’s decision to use force.18
According to this perspective, Blacks and other non-Whites are
disproportionately represented as victims of police shootings
because they disproportionately commit armed robberies, carry
firearms, and engage in behavior that police officers are likely to
find threatening, such as resisting arrest.19
The bulk of the social science research on race and police use of
deadly force conducted in the 1980s supports the race-is-irrelevant
position of Belief Perspective II.20 According to this body of
research, a police officer’s decision to shoot a suspect is influenced
by non-racial factors, such as whether the suspect appears to be
armed and whether he or she complies with police orders.
14. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, USA: RACE, RIGHTS AND POLICE BRUTALITY (1999);
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND
IN
THE
available
at
ACCOUNTABILITY
UNITED
STATES
39
(1998),
http://www.hrw.org/reports98/police/index.htm.
15. John S. Goldkamp, Minorities as Victims of Police Shootings: Interpretations of Racial
Disproportionality and Police Use of Deadly Force, 2 JUST. SYS. J. 169, 171-77 (1976).
16. Takagi, supra note 12, at 203.
17. Goldkamp, supra note 15, at 172.
18. Id. at 177.
19. Id. at 173.
20. See, e.g., Mark Blumberg, Race and Police Shootings: An Analysis in Two Cities, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 152 (James J. Fyfe ed., 1981) (finding that
similarly situated Blacks and Whites receive the same types and amount of force from
police); Michael F. Brown, Use of Deadly Force by Patrol Officers: Training Implications, 12 J.
POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 133 (1984); Fyfe, supra note 10, at 190 (finding that Blacks make up
a disproportionate share of police shooting victims reportedly armed with guns or
engaged in robberies); George A. Hayden, Police Discretion in the Use of Deadly Force: An
Empirical Study of Information Usage in Deadly Force Decisionmaking, 9 J. POLICE SCI. &
ADMIN. 102 (1981); R. James Holzworth & Catherine B. Pipping, Drawing a Weapon: An
Analysis of Police Judgments, 13 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 185 (1985). Several of the studies
that reach this conclusion, however, involve self-reporting by police officers about
whether the race of the suspect would influence their own decision to use force.
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More recent studies which I discuss in Part I suggest the
opposite. Moreover, the actual lived experiences of persons living
in poor minority communities and the perception in these
communities is that race not only matters, it matters significantly.
In the foreword to Race and Criminal Justice, Daniel Georges-Abeyie,
an African-Puerto Rican/Virgin Islander professor of criminology,
remarks, “Through my own real life experiences I know that the
differential treatment of minorities occurs. I also known [sic] that it
is more widespread than official statistics might indicate.”21 A few
older social science studies also support the view that race matters.22
Those who are inclined to support Belief Perspective II might
ask why we as a society should care about the beliefs of a minority
of citizens. We should care because actual and perceived unfairness
and racial bias in law enforcement undermines police effectiveness.
Simmering tensions between communities of color and the police, if
unaddressed, can ignite into chaos like the rioting that erupted after
the acquittals of the four Los Angeles police officers charged with
the brutal beating of Rodney King. The post-verdict chaos was a
wake-up call, serving as a reminder that just below the surface of
apparent calm brews deep anger, resentment, and a feeling that the
criminal justice system protects some segments of the population
better than others. As Attorney General Janet Reno noted in an
address at a conference on strengthening police-community
relations in June 1999:
Tensions between police and minority residents affect all aspects
of the criminal justice system. When citizens do not trust their
local police officer, they are less willing to report crime, and less
willing to be witnesses in criminal cases. Jurors are less willing to
accept as truthful the testimony of officers, and recruitment of
officers from minority communities becomes that much more
difficult.23

The problem with Goldkamp’s two belief perspectives theory is
that it frames the problem in all-or-nothing terms. Either police
officers are bigots who intentionally target racial minorities (Belief
Perspective I) or they are completely unbiased and color-blind
(Belief Perspective II). The truth more likely lies somewhere
21. Daniel Georges-Abeyie, Foreword to RACE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at ix (Michael J.
Lynch & E. Britt Patterson eds., 1991).
22. See, e.g., James J. Fyfe, Blind Justice: Police Shootings in Memphis, 73 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 707 (1982); Takagi, supra note 12, at 203.
23. Janet Reno, Speech at the Justice Department Police Integrity Conference (June 9,
1999) (transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/1999/
agpoliceinteg.htm).
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between these two extremes.
In this essay, I offer a third way to explain the disparate
treatment respective segments of the population experience at the
hands of police officers—an explanation that accommodates both the
lived experiences of persons of color and the belief that police
officers use force more often against persons of color because such
individuals appear to be more threatening to the officer. I suggest
that racial stereotypes operate at a subconscious level to influence
the police officer’s decision to use deadly force.24 The police officer
may not consciously decide to use deadly force because of the
suspect’s race, but the suspect’s race nonetheless influences the
officer. Racial stereotypes thus may alter the officer’s perception of
danger, threat, and resistance to authority. A simple question,
“Officer, why am I being stopped?” may be perceived as behavior
challenging the officer’s authority when asked by someone who is
Black. Police officers may also “see” danger more readily when
dealing with a person of color. Just as racial and ethnic stereotypes
influence private citizens’ decisions to use force in self-defense, such
stereotypes can also influence police officers’ decisions to use force.
I should note at the outset that I am not making any empirical
claims regarding the extent to which racial stereotypes influence the
police officer’s decision to use force. I leave this to the social
scientists who are trained in the methodologies of empirical and
quantitative research. My purpose in this essay is merely to
challenge the conventional wisdom that race does not influence the
police officer’s decision to use deadly force. Conventional wisdom
suggests that police officers use deadly force only when necessary to
protect themselves or others from death or serious bodily injury.
We know this is the conventional wisdom because most fatal police
shootings do not result in the filing of criminal charges against the
officer. In the rare case that is prosecuted, the officer is usually
acquitted or, if convicted, given a sentence that is much lower than
the penalty usually imposed when a private citizen shoots and kills
another person.25
While cases involving clear acts of police brutality without even
the slightest suggestion of justification, such as the beating and
sodomy of Abner Louima on August 9, 1997, are similar to cases in
24. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); see also Linda Hamilton Krieger,
Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251
(1998); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1187-90 (1995)
(explaining the human tendency to categorize).
25. Alexa P. Freeman, Unscheduled Departures: The Circumvention of Just Sentencing for
Police Brutality, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 703, 727 (1996).
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which police assert self-defense, such as the case concerning the
beating of Rodney King, this essay is not about clear acts of police
brutality.26 This essay deals only with the subject of police use of
deadly force in claimed self-defense cases.
Claimed self-defense cases are complex, because officers who
assert self-defense presumably believe sincerely that such force was
necessary to protect against death or great bodily harm. It is hard to
feel punitive toward someone who sincerely believes he is acting in
self-defense. The law, however, requires that officers who claim
self-defense must have more than just an honest belief in the need to
act in self-defense. The officer’s belief must also be reasonable or, as
courts have held, one that a reasonably prudent officer in the same
situation would have held.27
The reasonableness requirement can be helpful and problematic
at the same time. On the one hand, the reasonableness requirement
operates as a check on the officer’s subjective beliefs. It ensures an
objective standard against which the officer’s personal beliefs are to
be measured so that an officer’s completely unfounded and
irrational fears cannot justify actions that injure innocent citizens.
On the other hand, the reasonableness requirement provides a way
in which social attitudes and biases can influence the legal
determination regarding the validity of police use of force. Racial
stereotypes can make an officer’s use of deadly force seem
reasonable when without such stereotypes, the officer’s actions
would appear unjustified. If stereotypes encourage police officers to
use deadly force against certain members of the community and not
others, a critical examination of the reasonableness of the officer’s
belief in the need to use force is necessary.
Addressing the problem of racial stereotypes influencing a
police officer’s perception of criminality and danger is a difficult
task for several reasons. First, all police work requires some amount
of stereotyping or generalizing about people based on external
characteristics. Police officers in the field must quickly size up a
suspect and make decisions about how to handle a situation. In
making split-second decisions, officers often must rely on external
cues, such as dress, demeanor, location, and race. Because some
stereotyping is necessary, it is easy to think that any and all
stereotyping is permissible.
The second problem lies in the deeply ingrained belief that the
use of force is part and parcel of good police work. Police officers
often need to use force in order to do their jobs. Indeed, many
26. For a discussion of such cases, see Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police
Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1275 (1999).
27. Santana v. City of Hartford, 283 F. Supp. 2d 720, 727 (D. Conn. 2003).
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people feel police officers have a right to use force against
uncooperative suspects. As Paul Chevigny notes, “We’ve all heard
people say, ‘Well, if the police have to kick a little butt in order to
keep order, so be it.’”28 Television shows like NYPD Blue, America’s
Most Wanted, COPS, and even Law and Order depict police officers as
good guys who need to break the rules sometimes by roughing up
suspects in order to get to the truth.
This essay seeks to challenge the standard color-blind view of
police decisions to use deadly force. I argue that race norms or
racial stereotypes often operate at a subconscious level to alter
police officers’ perceptions of threat. I start in Part I by discussing
Charles Lawrence’s theory of unconscious racism. Part I also
examines recent social science research that supports my theory that
racial stereotypes operate at a subconscious level to influence police
officer decisions to use deadly force. Part II uses actual cases to
illustrate ways in which stereotypes about Blacks can affect police
officer decisions to shoot. Part III explains and critiques the existing
mechanisms for holding police officers and other law enforcement
officials accountable for fatal shootings of innocent individuals. Part
III concludes with some tentative ideas on how we as a society,
through our jury system, can help encourage police officers to
overcome the inevitable influence of racial stereotypes on their
decisions to use deadly force in the field.

I. Unconscious Racism
At the start of the Museum of Tolerance in Los Angeles,
California, one is presented with two doors. One door is labeled
“prejudiced.” The other is marked “unprejudiced.” If one tries to
enter the door marked “unprejudiced,” one finds that the door is
locked and one cannot enter the museum through that door. The
following message is then projected onto the door:
THINK . . . NOW USE OTHER DOOR.

The message the museum is trying to send is that we are all
prejudiced—some to a greater degree, others to a lesser degree. It is
more precise, however, to say that racial stereotypes affect us all,
influencing both the way we view others and the way we
understand ourselves. Professor Charles Lawrence comments on
this shared experience:
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in
28. Paul G. Chevigny, Police Violence: Causes and Cures, 7 J.L. & POL’Y 85, 86 (1998).
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which racism has played and still plays a dominant role. Because
of this shared experience, we also inevitably share many ideas,
attitudes, and beliefs that attach significance to an individual’s
race and induce negative feelings and opinions about nonwhites.
To the extent that this cultural belief system has influenced all of
us, we are all racists. At the same time, most of us are unaware of
our racism. We do not recognize the ways in which our cultural
experience has influenced our beliefs about race or the occasions
on which those beliefs affect our actions. In other words, a large
part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is
influenced by unconscious racial motivation.29

Americans attach significance to race. When a young Black
male stranger approaches and starts talking to us, we may worry
about getting robbed or conned. When we see an Asian woman, we
may assume she is quiet and deferential to authority. When a
Mexican man gets angry, we may attribute his anger to machismo,
something we believe Mexican men have as part of their cultural
upbringing. Most of us are not conscious of our assumptions based
on race and ethnicity. We think of racism as the intentional acts and
beliefs of a few, not something we all engage in. According to
Lawrence, however, “[r]acism is in large part a product of the
unconscious.”30 In other words, racism manifests itself not only in
the intentional acts of bigots, but also in the actions of well-meaning
individuals who are not conscious of the ways in which race
influences their everyday decision-making.
Lawrence offers two possible explanations for our unconscious
racism. One explanation rests on psychoanalytic theory, which
suggests that the human mind defends against the discomfort of
guilt by refusing to recognize beliefs that conflict with what the
individual has learned is good or right. American society today
embraces the principle of equality and rejects racism as immoral.
When one experiences conflict between one’s deeply ingrained
personal beliefs, which may be inegalitarian, and the principle of
equality, the mind excludes racism from consideration.31 The
second explanation rests on cognitive psychology. Cognitive
psychologists theorize that racism is transmitted by tacit cultural
understandings. The media, one’s parents, one’s peers, and
authority figures all communicate certain beliefs and preferences. A
child may never be told explicitly that Blacks are inferior, but learns
this lesson by observing the behavior of others.32
29. Lawrence, supra note 24, at 322.
30. Id. at 330 (defining racism as “a set of beliefs whereby we irrationally attach
significance to something called race”).
31. Id. at 331-36.
32. Id. at 323.
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When police officers shoot unarmed Black citizens, they may be
responding to racial cues that link Blacks to criminality and
violence. All of us are influenced by such racial cues, but police
officers, more than private citizens, often find themselves in
situations in which they have to respond quickly without thinking.
In the field, police officers may not have time to evaluate whether
they are responding to actual danger or assumptions based on a
person’s race.
Recent social science studies provide support for the notion that
police decisions to use deadly force are influenced by racial
stereotypes. In one recent study, Anthony Greenwald, Mark Oakes,
and Hunter Hoffman, psychology professors at the University of
Washington in Seattle, sought to determine the extent to which
police shootings of unarmed Black citizens “are due to reduced
perceptual sensitivity (i.e., less ability to distinguish weapons from
harmless objects when these objects are held by Blacks than by
Whites) or increased response bias (i.e., increased tendency to
respond to any object held by a Black as a weapon).”33 Greenwald,
Oakes, and Hoffman created a desktop virtual reality simulation in
which subjects (University of Washington undergraduate students)
were asked to play the role of a plainclothes police officer who has
to rapidly respond to armed and unarmed persons. Subjects were
given less than one second to respond to individuals from one of
three categories of targets—criminals, fellow police officers, and
citizens.34 All the targets appeared in street clothes, but criminals
and police officers held guns while citizens held harmless objects,
such as cameras, flashlights, and beer bottles. The only variable that
distinguished police officers from criminals was their race.35
Subjects played the simulation exercise twice.
In one
simulation, subjects were told all the criminals were White and all
the police officers were Black.36 In the second simulation, they were
told all the criminals were Black and all the police officers were
White.37 Citizens could be either Black or White. Subjects were told
to click the mouse button if they thought the target was a criminal
with a gun, hit the space bar if they thought the target was a fellow
officer with a gun, and do nothing if they thought the target was an
innocent citizen with a harmless object in hand.38
The researchers found that subjects had greater difficulty
33. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Targets of Discrimination: Effects of Race on Responses
to Weapons Holders, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 399, 400 (2003).
34. Id. at 401.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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distinguishing weapons from harmless objects when dealing with
Black targets as opposed to White targets.39 Additionally, subjects
shot at Black targets more often than White targets, “giving the
weapon-appropriate response more readily to Black than to White
targets.”40 In other words, the students exhibited both reduced
perceptual sensitivity and increased response bias towards Blacks.
One might dispute the findings of the Greenwald study on the
ground that untrained college students are likely to react differently
than trained police officers to visual cues like the ones given in the
above experiment. Police officers, unlike college students, receive
special training in the use of deadly force, which presumably would
diminish the likelihood of mistaken shootings. There is, however,
reason to suspect that police officers would react similarly to the
college students in Greenwald’s study. Police officers are exposed
to the same societal messages about race as ordinary citizens.
Moreover, other studies have reached findings similar to the
Greenwald study.41
In 2001, B. Keith Payne published the results of two
experiments.42 In Experiment 1, subjects were shown a photo of a
Black or White male face (cropped so that his hair and clothing were
not visible), followed by a photo of either a handgun or a tool (e.g., a
pair of pliers, a socket wrench, or an electric drill). Subjects were
told to identify the object in the second photo as either a gun or a
tool by pressing one of two keys on a keypad. Subjects were told
that the experiment required both speed and accuracy, but were
given an unlimited amount of time to respond. Payne found that
racial primes had a significant influence on the subjects’ ability to
accurately distinguish between weapons and harmless objects.43
Subjects in Experiment 1 were quicker to accurately identify a
39. Id. at 403.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and
Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181 (2001)
(finding that participants identified guns faster when primed with Black faces compared
with White faces and misidentified tools as guns more often when primed with Black
faces than with White faces) [hereinafter Automatic and Controlled Processes]; see also B.
Keith Payne et al., Best Laid Plans: Effects of Goals on Accessibility Bias and Cognitive Control
in Race-Based Misperceptions of Weapons, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 384 (2002)
[hereinafter Best Laid Plans]. Joshua Correll has conducted similar research with similar
results. Subjects in Correll’s study were quicker to shoot an armed target when the
target was African American than when he was White and more likely to shoot at an
unarmed target when he was African American than when he was White. See Joshua
Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially
Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314 (2002).
42. See generally Automatic and Controlled Processes, supra note 41; Best Laid Plans, supra
note 41.
43. Automatic and Controlled Processes, supra note 41, at 190.
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weapon when they were primed by a Black face as opposed to a
White face.44
Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1, except this time subjects
were told that they had to respond quickly. Payne found that
subjects in Experiment 2 were more likely to falsely identify a tool as
a gun when primed by a Black face as opposed to a White face.45
Payne’s research has important implications for law
enforcement. When an officer confronts a Black suspect who is in
fact armed, the officer may respond more quickly and arguably
more effectively than when he confronts an armed White suspect.
On the other hand, when the officer confronts an unarmed Black
suspect, his quick resort to deadly force can result in the tragic death
of an innocent person. As Payne explains:
These data suggest that, because the bias caused by race is largely
automatic, it may be difficult to control directly, especially when
cognitive resources are limited. Returning to the example of the
police officer in a confrontation with a possibly armed suspect, we
can draw several conclusions about the automatic and controlled
processes that may serve as independent bases for responding. If
the officer is like the average participant in our experiments, he or
she will experience some degree of automatic bias when
interacting with a Black suspect. That is, the officer will be more
prone to respond as if a Black suspect is armed, compared to a
White suspect. In situations where a Black suspect is actually
armed, this bias will facilitate performance: The officer will be
faster to respond, and less likely to make an error, compared to
the case in which a White suspect is armed. However, in
situations where a Black suspect is unarmed, the automatic bias
may tragically interfere with performance.46

II. Racial Stereotypes in Action: The Black-as-Criminal
Stereotype
The results of the Greenwald and Payne studies are consistent
with the theory that racial stereotypes influence behavior at a
subconscious level. One of the stereotypes most often applied to
African Americans, particularly young Black males, is what I call the
Black-as-Criminal stereotype. Under this stereotype, Blacks are
presumed more dangerous, more prone to violence, and more likely
to be involved in criminal activity than other members of society.47
44. Id. at 185.
45. Id. at 190.
46. Id. at 190-91.
47. This essay focuses on stereotypes about Blacks, not because stereotypes about
Asian Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans do not exist, but because of the paucity
of data on police use of deadly force against non-Black minorities. But see Cynthia Kwei
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One reason why many people are fearful of Black men is
because statistics show Blacks are arrested and convicted at rates
that greatly exceed their numbers in the general population.48
Relying upon such statistics, however, is problematic. When the
total number of Blacks arrested for violent crime is compared to the
total number of Blacks in society, the former comprise less than one
percent of the total Black population.49 To assume that any Black
person one interacts with is likely to be a violent criminal attributes
the criminality of a few Blacks to the entire Black population. Such
generalization also overlooks the fact that most of the Blacks who
are incarcerated are serving time for non-violent drug offenses.50
Despite the misleading nature of statistical information
regarding Blacks and crime, the linkage between Blackness and
criminality persists. As a number of social science studies have
shown, people of all races tend to view Blacks as more dangerous
and more threatening than Whites.51
Whites, in contrast, are not generally viewed as potential
threats,52 even though there is no shortage of evidence that White
people, particularly White men, have been responsible for a great
deal of violence in this country. Two White teenage boys were
responsible for the deadly shooting at Columbine High School in
Littleton, Colorado in April 1999 that left thirteen dead and many
Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81
MINN. L. REV. 367 (1996) (discussing stereotypes about African Americans, Asian
Americans and Latinos).
48. On any given day in 1994, nearly one out of every three Black men in their
twenties was in prison or jail, or on probation or parole. MARC MAUER & TRACY
HULING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER 3 (1995). Blacks are arrested for murder, robbery, and
rape at a disproportionately high rate. In 1998, African Americans constituted 53.4
percent of those arrested for murder and non-negligent manslaughter, 55.3 percent of
those arrested for robbery, and 37.5 percent of those arrested for forcible rape. FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1998
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 228 (1999) [hereinafter CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES].
49. Lee, supra note 47, at 411-12.
50. MAUER & HULING, supra note 48, at 14.
51. Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence:
Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590
(1976); H. Andrew Sagar & Janet Ward Schofield, Racial and Behavioral Cues in Black and
White Children’s Perceptions of Ambiguously Aggressive Acts, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 590 (1980); Charles F. Bond et al., Responses to Violence in a Psychiatric Setting:
The Role of Patient’s Race, 14 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 448 (1988).
52. There is some evidence of the existence of a White serial killer stereotype. In
2002, when the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area was the scene of numerous
seemingly random sniper attacks, many believed the sniper was a White male because
so many serial killers in the past have been White males. Darryl Fears & Avis ThomasLester, Blacks Express Shock at Suspects’ Identity: Most Say They Expect a Serial Killer to be
White, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2002, at A17.
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more injured. A White man was responsible for the bombing of the
Oklahoma City federal building. Whites constitute more than twothirds of all individuals arrested for criminal activity, and more than
half of the individuals arrested for violent criminal activity.53
Nonetheless, Whites generally are not feared because of the color of
their skin.
A. Candy Bars, Keys, and Sunglasses: Racialized Fear of the
Young Black Male and the Imagined Gun
The fear of Black individuals is so powerful that law
enforcement officers often “see” guns in the hands of unarmed
Black men and women. For example, in 1997, a federal law
enforcement officer shot a Black teenager because he thought the
teen was carrying a gun. The teen was actually carrying a Three
Musketeers candy bar.
On November 6, 1997, at approximately 7:00 p.m., in Queens,
New York, Andre Burgess, a seventeen-year-old Black high school
student, was walking to a friend’s house with a Three Musketeers
candy bar in his right hand. Burgess was the goaltender and captain
of the Hillcrest High School soccer team. At around 138th Avenue
near 241st Street, Burgess passed an unmarked police car containing
undercover officers looking for a fugitive in a federal narcotics case.
After passing the car, Burgess started to open the wrapper of his
candy bar. Deputy Marshal William Cannon, who was sitting in the
unmarked car, thought Burgess’ silver foil-wrapped candy bar was
a gun. Cannon jumped out of the car, pointed his gun at Burgess,
and shouted at him.54 Burgess started to turn around to see who
was yelling at him. Before Burgess could complete his turn, Cannon
shot Burgess in the back of his left thigh. Burgess fell to the ground,
bleeding. Cannon quickly handcuffed Burgess, then shook hands
with other officers who had arrived on the scene. While Burgess
was lying on the ground, handcuffed and bleeding, he heard
Deputy Marshal Cannon, completely oblivious to Burgess’ pain,
remark to one of the officers, “Don’t I know you from some other
53. CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 48, at 210 (“Race distribution figures for
the total number of national arrests during 1998 showed 68 percent of the arrestees were
white, 30 percent were black, and the remainder were of other races. . . . Whites
accounted for 63 percent of the Index crime arrestees, 65 percent of the property crime
arrestees, and 58 percent of the violent crime arrestees.”).
54. Dennis Duggan, Black, Unarmed - and Often a Target, NEWSDAY, Feb. 9, 1999, at
A6. There is some dispute as to the precise words that Deputy Marshal Cannon shouted
before shooting Burgess. Cannon told prosecutors that he shouted, “U.S. Marshals.
Drop the gun.” Burgess, however, told police that Cannon only yelled, “hey you,” or
“hold it.” Selwyn Raab, Marshal Who Shot Youth Faced ‘94 Beating Charge, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 1997, at B3.
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case?”55
A Queens grand jury refused to return an indictment against
Deputy Marshal Cannon, finding that the law enforcement officer
reasonably believed the Black teenager posed an imminent threat of
death or serious bodily injury to the officer or others.56 Responding
to the grand jury’s decision, Cannon’s attorney, Lawrence Berger,
said the grand jury did the right thing. “Our position is and has
been that this was an unavoidable accident, one that Mr. Cannon felt
horrible about. Nevertheless, if the matter occurred exactly the
same way tomorrow, without the hindsight of knowing it was a
candy bar in Mr. Burgess’s hand, [Cannon] would have reacted the
same way.”57
There are several disturbing aspects to this case. First, it is
disturbing that a federal law enforcement officer could mistake a
Three Musketeers candy bar for a gun. If Deputy Marshal Cannon
had watched Burgess a few seconds longer before initiating the
confrontation, he might have realized the silver object in Burgess’
right hand was a candy bar. Right before the shooting, Burgess had
unwrapped the candy bar and was starting to take a bite out of it,
hardly something he would do if the item in his hand was a gun.
Second, from what is known about the case, it does not appear that
Burgess made any threatening moves right before he was shot.
Burgess had passed the unmarked police car and was walking away
from it when Deputy Marshal Cannon jumped out of the car and
shot him. Burgess started to turn towards the officer only after the
officer yelled, “Hey you. Hold on.” Third, Burgess was shot in the
back of his leg, undermining Cannon’s claim that he shot Burgess in
self-defense.58
The most disturbing thing about this incident was Cannon’s
attorney’s statement that if this same incident happened again
tomorrow, Cannon would react the same way. Moreover, this was
not the first time Deputy Marshal Cannon had been accused of
using excessive force against a Black man. Three years before he
shot Andre Burgess, Deputy Marshal Cannon was prosecuted for
55. Peter Noel, ‘I Thought He Had a Gun’, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 13, 1998, at 40.
56. Kit R. Roane, Deputy Marshal Is Cleared in Shooting of Queens Teen-ager, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 1998, at B5.
57. Id.
58. The fact that a person has been shot in the back does not necessarily indicate that
he did not pose a threat to the person who shot him. An attacker who is trying to avoid
a counter-attack can quickly turn, resulting in a shot to the back. See Lisa Steele,
Defending the Self-Defense Case, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 659, 676 (2003) (“A moderately healthy
person can turn his or her torso 180 [degrees] in .53 seconds and can turn his or her
entire body 180 [degrees] in .667 seconds. This is very close [to] the amount of time it
takes a trained police officer to fire a handgun.”).
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beating a handcuffed Black prisoner with a lead-filled leather
pouch.59 At Cannon’s trial, two former deputy marshals testified
that Cannon repeatedly struck the prisoner with an eight-inch
leather pouch, known as a slapjack, after the prisoner broke
Cannon’s nose while resisting an arrest.60 The two deputy marshals
had firsthand knowledge of this attack because they held the
prisoner down so that Cannon could beat him.61 These two deputy
marshals pled guilty to charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice, and
were dismissed from their jobs.62 Cannon, in contrast, was acquitted
of all charges, and was never disciplined by the Marshal’s Service
for this beating.63
It would be easy to write off the shooting of Andre Burgess as
an unfortunate but isolated incident caused by one bad cop. In fact,
this is the reaction most people have when confronted with
shocking examples of excessive force by the police. When the
beating of Rodney King was captured on home video and broadcast
all across the nation, many Whites were shocked that such a beating
by police officers, sworn to uphold the law, could take place in
America in the 1990s. The beating was seen as a horrible, tragic
aberration. African Americans, by and large, were not shocked by
the beating and saw it as just another example of the treatment they
were used to receiving from the police. As others have noted, what
was unique about the Rodney King case for Black America was not
that the beating occurred, but that it was captured on home video.
With more and more consumers purchasing camcorders, the
video recording of police misconduct may become more common.
On July 6, 2002, at approximately 5:00 p.m., Inglewood police officer
Jeremy Morse was caught on videotape slamming a handcuffed
African American male teenager named Donovan Jackson against
the hood of a patrol car, then punching the handcuffed Jackson in
the face for no apparent reason. Officer Morse claimed the sixteenyear-old Jackson started the confrontation by grabbing his crotch
after he was handcuffed. According to several news reports,
however, before Jackson was handcuffed and before the video
camera started recording, one of the five officers on the scene
punched Jackson twice in the face.64 Jackson was booked on
suspicion of assaulting a police officer, and later released. Officer
Morse was charged with felony assault under color of law and his
59. Raab, supra note 54.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Kasmirah Joyner, Enforcement Under Color of Authority Hurts All, NORTHERN STAR
(Northern Illinois University Wire), July 23, 2002.
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partner was charged with filing a false police report regarding
Jackson’s arrest. Both men pled not guilty. Despite the videotape,
in July 2003, Officer Morse’s first jury deadlocked on whether to
find him guilty of felony assault, forcing the judge presiding over
Morse’s trial to declare a mistrial.65 Officer Morse was tried a
second time. In February 2004, a second jury could not reach a
unanimous verdict, leading to another mistrial.
After two
unsuccessful trials, the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office
decided against prosecuting the case a third time.66
Because so many incidents of police force against Blacks and
other minorities go unreported, it is easy for those living
comfortable lives in middle- or upper-class neighborhoods to
believe that police abuse of force is uncommon. The United States
Supreme Court reflects this type of ostrich-with-its-head-in-the-sand
mentality when it treats acts of police brutality as aberrations or as
isolated incidents.67 For example, in 1983, the Supreme Court in City
of Los Angeles v. Lyons68 reversed a preliminary injunction issued by
a lower federal court prohibiting Los Angeles police officers from
using the chokehold unless threatened with death or serious bodily
injury. The Court vacated the injunction on the ground that Adolph
Lyons, a Black man who was stopped by Los Angeles police officers
for a traffic violation and without any provocation on his part was
subjected to a chokehold that rendered him unconscious and
damaged his larynx, lacked standing to sue since Lyons was not
likely to be stopped again by the Los Angeles police and subjected
to a chokehold.69 The Court’s refusal to see Lyons’s case as part of a
pattern and practice by the Los Angeles police department was
particularly disturbing in light of the fact that between 1975 and
1980, more than a dozen people, a significant number of them Black,
died after being subjected to chokeholds by Los Angeles police
officers.70
65. Anna Gorman, Fired Officer to Face Retrial, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2004, at B1.
66. Kimberly Edds, Calif. Policeman Won’t Be Tried Again, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2004, at
A11.
67. Bandes, supra note 26 (noting the judicial tendency to view instances of police
misconduct as isolated rather than systemic); David Dante Troutt, Screws, Koon, and
Routine Aberrations: The Use of Fictional Narratives in Federal Police Brutality Prosecutions,
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 18 (1999) (arguing that authority narratives are used to justify acts of
police brutality).
68. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
69. Id. at 111.
70. DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 162 (1999) (“By the time Lyons’s case reached the Supreme Court,
sixteen persons had been killed by police use of the chokehold; twelve of the victims
were black men.”). According to Human Rights Watch, the Los Angeles police
department still permits its officers to use the chokehold. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra
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Perhaps to the extent that a law enforcement officer mistook a
candy bar for a gun, the Andre Burgess case is unique. However, to
the extent that a law enforcement officer “saw” a weapon in an
unarmed Black man’s hand, the case is not at all unique. Many
unarmed Black men have been shot by law enforcement officers
who thought, or claimed they thought, the Black male suspect had a
gun. For example, two months after Andre Burgess was shot,
another young Black man was shot and killed because a police
officer thought he was armed. This Black man was “armed” with a
set of keys.
On Christmas day in 1997, at approximately 1:00 p.m. in
Brooklyn, New York, Officer Michael Davitt was among a team of
four police officers from the Brooklyn South Task Force responding
to a report of a domestic dispute at the Glenwood House, a housing
project in Carnegie. As the officers neared the housing project, they
heard what sounded like shots from the rooftop of one of the
buildings and saw a Black man on a wall near the roof. As the
police moved closer to the housing project, William Whitfield, a
twenty-two-year-old Black man, was leaving one of the apartments
where his fiancée, Candy Williams, lived. Because Williams did not
have a phone, Whitfield was going to call his mother from a pay
phone to tell her that he was bringing Williams and her children
over for Christmas dinner. Whitfield had just given Williams a
diamond ring and planned to marry her in 1998. As Whitfield came
around the corner, he ran into Officers Davitt and Michael Dugan
who ordered him to stop. Unbeknownst to the officers, Whitfield
was wanted on three outstanding warrants for failing to appear in
court on two misdemeanor assault charges and a marijuana
possession charge. He also had some marijuana in his pocket.
Whitfield knew that if he stopped, he would likely spend the rest of
Christmas in jail rather than with his family, so he ran.
Officer Davitt shouted at Whitfield, “Stop!” to which Whitfield
responded, “Not today.” Whitfield raced into the Milky Way
Supermarket at 1669 Ralph Avenue, and ran to the back of the store
to hide behind an aisle of groceries. The officers followed quickly
on Whitfield’s heels with their guns drawn, ordering Whitfield to
come out. When Whitfield did come out from behind the aisle with
his hands up, Officer Davitt shot him once in the chest and killed
him. Officer Davitt claimed that he saw a gleam of silver in
Whitfield’s hand and assumed Whitfield had a gun.71
note 14, at 29.
71. See Robert D. McFadden, After Man Is Slain by Officer, Anger and Calls for Patience,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1997, at B1 [hereinafter After Man Is Slain]; Robert D. McFadden,
Panel Finds Officer Was Justified in Unarmed Man’s Fatal Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1998,
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Despite an exhaustive search, no gun was found at or anywhere
near the scene of the police shooting.72 The only object found was a
large ring of keys, which Whitfield might have been clutching when
he tried to surrender to police.73 Nonetheless, a grand jury found
that Officer Davitt reasonably believed he or others were in imminent
danger of death or serious bodily injury and refused to issue an
indictment.74 Prior to shooting and killing William Whitfield,
Officer Davitt had been involved in numerous police shootings.75
He was named in twelve civilian complaints, seven of which alleged
excessive force.76 None of these complaints, however, resulted in
disciplinary action.77 In his personnel file, Officer Davitt had
thirteen commendations for exceptional, meritorious, and excellent
police duty.78
In another case, police officers shot and killed a Black man
because they thought he was carrying a gun and was about to use it
on them. Actually, the man was carrying a pair of sunglasses and a
set of keys.79 On July 1, 1999, at approximately 9:40 p.m. in Salinas,
California, San Jose Sergeant Thomas Murphy and Officer Anthony
Mata were looking for a man named Odest Mitchell, who was
wanted for a series of hotel and gas station robberies.80 Mitchell was
nicknamed “The Leaper” by police because of his reputation for
leaping over counters, quickly overpowering hotel and gas station
clerks, and robbing them.81 Acting on a tip, the officers tracked
Mitchell to a gas station in Salinas where he was buying gas. The
officers ordered Mitchell to surrender, but instead he ran away from
the officers towards a freeway off-ramp.82 The officers followed
after him with their guns drawn. Suddenly, Mitchell stopped and
turned towards the officers. The officers fired twelve shots at

at A1 [hereinafter Panel Finds Officer Was Justified]; Noel, supra note 55.
72. After Man is Slain, supra note 71.
73. Panel Finds Officer Was Justified, supra note 71.
74. Id.
75. After Man is Slain, supra note 71; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, POLICE
BRUTALITY AND EXCESSIVE FORCE IN THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT (1996),
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engAMR510361996 (last visited
Nov. 13, 2004) (detailing other incidents of excessive force and police brutality by the
New York City police department).
76. After Man is Slain, supra note 71.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Bush Backer Backtracks on Fund-Solicitation Letter, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept.
26, 1999, at 2P.
80. Bill Romano et al., Police Shoot, Kill Armed-Robbery Suspect: 2nd This Week, 7th This
Year, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 3, 1999, at 1A.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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Mitchell. Six of these shots hit Mitchell and killed him.83
The officers explained that they fired at Mitchell because they
saw a metallic object in his hand and thought it was a gun.84 A
passing motorist who witnessed the shooting said he too thought
After an
Mitchell was carrying a metallic-looking object.85
investigation into the shooting, the Monterey County District
Attorney’s Office concluded that the object in Mitchell’s hand was a
pair of sunglasses, but declined to file criminal charges against the
officers.86
The Mitchell case is a difficult one to judge because the officers
were chasing a man who apparently had an extensive history of
violent criminal activity. At the time of the shooting, Mitchell was
suspected of being involved in fifteen armed robberies in the San
Francisco Bay Area.87 The two officers chasing Mitchell did not
know whether Mitchell was carrying a weapon, but when he
stopped running and turned towards them, they thought they saw
something metallic that could have been a gun.
It is always easy to criticize from the comfortable and safe
position of an armchair long after an incident has taken place.
Police officers on the street need to make quick decisions on a
moment’s notice. Many a police officer has been killed in the line of
duty by a suspect who has not hesitated to shoot. The officers who
shot and killed Odest Mitchell no doubt were worried that Mitchell
might try to shoot them in order to escape arrest. Nonetheless, as
the Greenwald and Payne studies suggest, the Black-as-Criminal
stereotype may have primed the officers to “see” something metallic
in Mitchell’s hand, rather than the pair of sunglasses he was actually
carrying.
B. Unprovoked Flight—Why an Unarmed Young Black Man
Might Run From Authority
On April 7, 2001, at approximately 2:00 a.m., nineteen-year-old
Timothy Thomas was visiting his girlfriend, Monique Wilcox, and
their three-month-old son in Over-the-Rhine, a high crime
neighborhood near downtown Cincinnati. Thomas went out to get
a pack of cigarettes at a nearby convenience store. On the way back,
he passed a nightclub. One of the club’s security guards, who
happened to be a police officer working as a security guard on the
83. Rodney Foo, Disagreement over Necessity for Killing Police, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Sept. 18, 1999, at 1A.
84. Id.
85. Romano, et al., supra note 80.
86. Foo, supra note 83.
87. Id.
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side, recognized Thomas as the subject of fourteen arrest warrants.
Most of these warrants were for minor traffic offenses, but it is not
clear that the officer knew this. For no apparent reason, Thomas
began running from the guard. During the ensuing minutes,
Thomas sprinted through a parking lot, scaled two chain-link
fences, and ended up in an L-shaped alley. Several officers,
including Officer Stephen Roach, joined in the chase. Officer Roach
entered the alley with his gun drawn. He called out, “Show me
your hands!” but without waiting for Thomas to comply with his
order, Roach fired, killing Thomas.88
Officer Roach’s initial explanation for the fatal shooting was
that it was an accident. When three fellow officers arrived on the
scene, Roach told them, “It just went off. It just went off.”89 Later
that day, when questioned by homicide investigators, Roach
changed his story. Now his reason for shooting was self-defense.
According to Roach, “Thomas had extended a clenched fist, he
couldn’t see what was in the fist, and he feared for his life.”90 Three
days later, when homicide investigators confronted Roach with a
videotape recorded by another police unit at the scene which
indicated Roach fired his weapon less than four seconds after
entering the alley, Roach returned to his initial explanation that the
shooting was accidental.91 In the ensuing weeks, Roach went back
to his claim of self-defense, telling friends and co-workers that he
shot Thomas because he thought Thomas was reaching for a gun in
his waistband.92
It is possible that Officer Roach was suffering from memory
distortion caused by the stress of being involved in a deadly
shooting. Studies have shown that it is fairly common for police
officers who are involved in fatal shootings to suffer from severe
gaps in memory and even false memories.93 Nonetheless, an
accidental shooting is a far cry from a shooting in self-defense. If
Roach shot Thomas because he believed Thomas posed an imminent
threat of death or serious bodily injury, then the shooting most
likely would have been intentional. An accidental shooting, in
contrast, suggests no intention to either pull the trigger or hit the
target.94
88. Mark Singer, A Year of Trouble: A City Subverts Itself, THE NEW YORKER, May 20,
2002, at 42.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Alexis Artwohl, Perceptual and Memory Distortion During Officer-Involved
Shootings, F.B.I. L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Oct. 2002, at 18.
94. See Steele, supra note 58, at 663 (“Self-defense is all-or-nothing. In order to
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Apparently, Thomas’s flight prompted the ensuing police
chase. While flight is viewed by many as a strong indicator of guilt,
Thomas may have started running because he feared being roughed
up by police. His mother told one reporter that about a year before
his death, Timothy, his cousin, and a few other men were standing
in front of the building where they lived when they were suddenly
accosted by several policemen.95 The officers slammed the young
men against the wall and then threw them onto the ground.96 The
officers then jammed their knees into the backs of the young men,
pulled their arms back, cuffed them, and searched them. Finding
nothing, the officers let the men go.97 A few months later, Timothy
was walking to the grocery store when he, along with five or six
other young men, was again accosted by police officers and forced
to lie face down on the pavement.98 Timothy’s mother told reporter
Mark Singer, “My son had a fear of police officers. His thing was,
‘Mom, if they could do this to me in broad daylight with everybody
watching, what would they do in the dark?’”99 Thomas had
fourteen outstanding arrest warrants, most of which were for traffic
offenses, and he might have run because he was afraid of being
taken into custody.100
The current Supreme Court is of the view that unprovoked
flight from a police officer in a high crime area can give rise to a
reasonable suspicion that the person fleeing is involved in criminal
activity, justifying the officer’s decision to stop the person.101 There
are, however, many reasons why an innocent person might flee
from the police. Responding to Supreme Court Justice Antonin
Scalia’s suggestion in California v. Hodari D.102 that only the guilty
flee from police, Law Professor Tracey Maclin writes:
From a police perspective, Justice Scalia’s remarks may make
establish it, the client has to admit being at the crime scene, with a weapon, which he or
she used to harm the aggressor. In one swoop, the client has given up alibi and
mistaken identity defenses. He or she has given up the defense of accident.”).
95. Singer, supra note 88, at 44.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. One problem with this theory is that Thomas started running upon seeing a
nightclub security guard who was an off-duty police officer. We do not know whether
Thomas knew the guard was an off-duty police officer, but it is possible that Thomas
had previously encountered this officer during one of his prior run-ins with the police
and therefore knew the guard was a police officer. Thomas’s otherwise inexplicable
decision to run right after seeing the guard supports this theory.
101. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000).
102. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).

DRAFT

Fall 2004]

3/4/05 12:12 PM

“BUT I THOUGHT HE HAD A GUN”

23

sense. “Flight from an approaching patrol car implies guilt; an
innocent person, patrolmen reason, would have nothing to fear
from the police and would not [run] away” as did Hodari. Of
course, this viewpoint never considers that Hodari, a black youth,
may have had alternative reasons for wanting to avoid the cops.
Many persons who have never committed a crime have
ambivalent or negative attitudes about the police. Perhaps, a
youth like Hodari flees at the sight of police because he does not
wish to drop his pants, as many black youths in Boston have been
forced to do, just because the cops suspect he belongs to a gang or
is selling drugs.
Or maybe Hodari has had an older sibling or friend roughed up
by the police, and does not wish to undergo a similar experience
with the approaching officers. Perhaps Hodari has seen the
video-tape of the Los Angeles police beating and kicking Rodney
King, or he has seen the NBC video of Don Jackson, a former
police officer himself, being pushed through a store window by
Long Beach, California police officers for no reason. Maybe
Hodari believed that the officer who wants to ask him “What’s
going on here?” may engage in similar brutality in his case.103

Moreover, while flight from police in a high crime
neighborhood might give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity, it does not necessarily support a reasonable belief that the
suspect is armed and dangerous and poses an imminent threat of
death or serious bodily injury. Flight would seem to suggest the
opposite: one running away from a police officer is clearly not in the
process of attacking the officer.
Thomas’s death sparked three days and four nights of protests
and violence in Cincinnati.104 Many in the African American
community saw the police shooting of Thomas as part of a pattern
and practice of police brutality against African American males.105
Thomas was the fifteenth Cincinnati police homicide victim in only
six years. All fifteen of these Cincinnati police shooting victims
were Black.106
On May 7, 2001, Roach was indicted and charged with two
misdemeanors arising from his shooting of Thomas: negligent
homicide (carrying a maximum possible sentence of six months in
jail) and obstructing official business (carrying a maximum penalty
103. Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters”—Some Preliminary Thoughts About
Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 276 (1991).
104. Singer, supra note 88, at 43.
105. Id. at 45.
106. Id.
Cincinnati police union spokesperson Keith Fangman defended the
department, saying that most of the Blacks killed by Cincinnati police were armed.
Fangman also stated that twelve of the last fourteen Cincinnati officers killed were shot
by Black men. Id.
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of ninety days in jail).107 The case went to trial in September 2001.
Roach waived his right to a jury trial, electing to have his fate
determined by Municipal Judge Ralph Winkler. On September 26,
2001, Judge Winkler acquitted Roach of all charges, explaining that
he believed the officer acted reasonably in self-defense.108 As for
Roach changing his explanation for the shooting, the judge said the
discrepancies in his story were not substantial.109
C. Racialized Fear of the Young Black Female
Young Black females have also been shot and killed by police
officers who see them as a deadly threat. In June 1999, for example,
a Chicago police officer shot and killed a young Black woman,
thinking the woman was brandishing a gun. The woman was
holding a cellular phone in her hand when she was shot.
On June 4, 1999, LaTanya Haggerty, a twenty-six-year-old
computer analyst at a downtown Chicago encyclopedia company
and a graduate of Southern Illinois University, was riding in the
passenger seat of a 1986 Oldsmobile driven by her friend Raymond
Smith.110 Two officers noticed that the Oldsmobile was blocking
traffic in the 8800 block of South Cottage Grove Avenue in Chicago,
Illinois, and asked Smith to move on.111 Smith backed up, almost
hitting the officers, and then sped off. The officers fired shots at
Smith’s car and gave chase.112 Using his cellular telephone, Smith
called his mother to tell her that the police were chasing him.113 The
police finally succeeded in blocking Smith’s car in the 6400 block of
King Drive. The officers ordered Smith and Haggerty to come
out.114 Smith jumped out of the car and tried to run, while
Haggerty, who was talking with Smith’s mother on the cell phone,
stayed in the vehicle.115 Officer Serena Daniels, also African
American, was standing on the driver’s side of the car near the rear
107. Francis X. Clines, Officer Charged in Killing that Roiled Cincinnati, N.Y. TIMES, May
8, 2001, at A16.
108. Robert E. Pierre, Officer Is Acquitted in Killing that Led to Riots in Cincinnati, WASH.
POST, Sept. 27, 2001, at A2 (noting that Judge Winkler told a packed courtroom that
Officer Roach made a split-second decision to shoot Timothy Thomas because the youth
made a sudden movement that startled Roach during a chase through a dark alley in an
“especially dangerous section of Cincinnati”).
109. Id.
110. Jennifer Vigil & James Janega, 2 Killed in Run-Ins with City Police: Victims’ Families
Demanding Answers, CHI. TRIB., June 6, 1999, at 1.
111. Id.
112. Todd Lighty, Untold Story of Haggerty Shooting: Report Shows Witnesses Don’t Back
Cop’s Account, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 12, 1999, at 1.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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door with her nine millimeter Smith & Wesson aimed at
Haggerty.116 Suddenly, without any apparent reason, Daniels fired
at Haggerty.117 Haggerty screamed and cried out, “They shot me,
Raymond.”118 When officers opened the passenger side door,
Haggerty tumbled face first onto the sidewalk, a cell phone falling
from her left hand.119 Officer Daniels knelt beside Haggerty, and
said, “I’m sorry. I didn’t mean to shoot you. I thought you had a
gun.”120
Officer Daniels told investigators that she fired her weapon
because she saw a shiny, silvery object in Haggerty’s hand and
mistook it for a gun.121 According to an internal police report of the
shooting, however, not one eyewitness corroborated Officer Daniels’
contention that Haggerty was holding a shiny, silvery object in her
hand that might have been mistaken for a gun.122 All of the
eyewitnesses to the shooting, including a police officer standing on
the passenger side of the car with his gun drawn and aimed at
Haggerty, saw a black cell phone in Haggerty’s hand, not a shiny
object.123 One eyewitness said Haggerty had both hands in the air
and was saying, “I’m getting out; I’m getting out,” just before she
was shot and killed.124 Police did find a four-inch silver padlock, the
kind placed on a car’s steering wheel to prevent theft, on the floor of
the car on the passenger’s side.
However, no discernible
fingerprints were on the padlock, calling into question whether
Haggerty was holding the padlock when she was shot. It also seems
unlikely that Haggerty would have grabbed a car steering wheel
padlock while surrounded by police officers with guns drawn.
The Haggerty case is noteworthy for several reasons. First, it
suggests that the image of the Black-as-Criminal stereotype is
inscribed on Black women as well as Black men. Second, the case
suggests that the stereotype can affect Black individuals’
perceptions of other Blacks. Of course, just as in other cases, there is
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. In March 2000, Officer Daniels was fired after a civilian police board found
that she shot Haggerty without justification. Gary Marx & Terry Wilson, 3 Fired in
Haggerty Case, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 18, 2000, at 1. According to the civilian review board,
“[the] use of deadly force here was not warranted because, in light of all the evidence,
the Board does not find that Officer Daniels reasonably believed that deadly force was
necessary.” Id.
121. Lighty, supra note 112.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Todd Lighty & Steve Mills, Witness Surfaces in Shooting by Cop, CHI. TRIB., June
12, 1999, at 1.
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no way to prove that the Black-as-Criminal stereotype influenced
Officer Daniels’ “seeing” a gun in LaTanya Haggerty’s hand. As a
Black woman herself, Officer Daniels should have been particularly
sensitive to the fact that not all Black women are dangerous or
violent.125 Nonetheless, in the heat of the moment, Officer Daniels
thought a cell phone looked like a gun. Would she have “seen” a
gun if the girl in the car had been a blond or a redhead?
In another fatal police shooting, a young Black woman was shot
and killed by Riverside police officers while she was lying semiconscious in a car with a gun in her lap. On December 28, 1998, just
after midnight, in Riverside, California, Tyisha Miller, a nineteenyear-old Black teenager, was returning home from a night out with
friends when she discovered that the car she was driving, a White
Nissan Sentra belonging to her aunt, had a flat tire.126 Miller was in
the car with her best friend, Bug. A man stopped to help the two
girls change the flat tire, but they discovered that the spare tire was
also flat. The man followed Tyisha and Bug to a nearby gas station,
then drove Bug to a friend’s house so she could call for help.
Uncomfortable with being left alone at a gas station at such a late
hour, Tyisha got back into her car, locked the doors, and waited
with a possibly inoperable .38-caliber handgun on her lap to
discourage potential attackers.127 She felt cold and a little dizzy.
125. The fact that Black police officers use force against Black suspects is used by
some as support for the argument that the problem of police use of force against
minorities is not a problem of racial discrimination or bias. Hubert G. Locke, The Color of
Law and the Issue of Color: Race and the Abuse of Police Power, in POLICE VIOLENCE:
UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE 129, 142 (William A. Geller
& Hans Toch eds., 1996). Hubert Locke rejects this proposition, explaining that “the
studies suggest that residential and deployment patterns in many jurisdictions place
officers of color in exceptionally dangerous places—where they are, more than fellow
white officers, likely to have to use deadly force legitimately, both on and off duty.” Id.;
see also William A. Geller & Kevin J. Karales, Shootings of and by Chicago Police, 72 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1813 (1981) (theorizing that the reason Black officers are more likely
than White officers to shoot Black citizens is because Black officers are more likely to be
assigned to high crime minority neighborhoods); Robert E. Worden, The Causes of Police
Brutality: Theory and Evidence on Police Use of Force, in POLICE VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING
AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE, supra, at 23, 28. Alternatively, Locke
suggests that “the overaggressive peer culture of policing in some agencies is so strong
that it pressures Black officers, who might know better, into abusing minority-race
citizens.” Locke, supra, at 142.
126. Phil Pitchford, No Charges in Miller Shooting: DA Cites Poor Judgment but Sees No
Crime or Racism, PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), May 7, 1999, at A19.
127. Id. It should be noted that the gun Miller was holding was nonfunctional when
examined by Philip Pelzel, a senior criminalist with the California Department of Justice.
Pelzel could not ascertain when the gun became inoperable. The District Attorney’s
Report on the shooting of Tyisha Miller notes that the gun could have been operable at
the time of the incident and could have become inoperable after being dropped. There is
no evidence, however, that the gun was dropped during the incident. Id.
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Tyisha turned on her emergency hazard blinkers and kept the
engine running so she could keep the heater and radio on, then
reclined the driver’s seat and began to doze.128
In the meantime, Bug made it to a friend’s house and called
Tyisha’s home. She spoke with Antonette Joiner, Tyisha’s cousin,
and told Antonette that Tyisha was at a gas station on Brockton
Avenue with a flat tire and needed help. Antonette and her friend,
Chilean King, rushed to the gas station. When they arrived, they
found Tyisha lying unconscious in the front driver’s seat of her car
with a gun on her lap. Tyisha appeared to be in some kind of
medical distress as she was shaking, rolling her eyes, and drooling
at the mouth. The girls tried to get Tyisha’s attention by knocking
on the car window, but when Tyisha failed to respond, Antonette
called Tyisha’s aunt and asked her to send someone with an extra
set of car keys. Chilean called 911, explaining to the dispatcher that
Tyisha seemed in need of medical attention.129
Instead of sending an ambulance to the scene, the dispatcher
sent four officers and a sergeant from the Riverside County Police
Department. The officers arrived at the gas station shortly before
2:00 a.m. Less than seven minutes later, they had unleashed more
than twenty bullets into the car, killing Tyisha Miller.130
It is unclear exactly what happened just before Tyisha Miller
was shot and killed. Initially, the officers claimed they started
shooting because Tyisha fired the first shot.131 Later, when the
evidence gathered at the scene of the crime failed to support this
scenario, the officers backed down from this initial claim and
instead maintained they shot Tyisha when she reached for the gun
on her lap.132
The District Attorney’s investigation into the shooting is very
revealing. According to the District Attorney’s report, after the
officers’ attempts to wake Tyisha by shouting at her and shaking her
car failed, Officer Wayne Stuart tried to break the driver’s side
window by hitting it with his baton.133 The sound of Officer Stuart’s
baton hitting the car window did rouse Tyisha who sat up in a daze,
picked up her pager, and looked at it. One officer yelled at the
others to hold their fire. The other officers backed away from the
car. Tyisha then laid back down.134
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Ana A. Lima & Phil Pitchford, Questions over Police Slaying, PRESS-ENTERPRISE
(Riverside, Cal.), Dec. 29, 1998, at A1.
132. Id.
133. Pitchford, supra note 126.
134. Id.
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Next, Officer Daniel Hotard, who was standing next to the
driver’s window, used his baton to break the window, then reached
into the car in an attempt to retrieve Tyisha’s gun. Suddenly,
Officer Hotard heard a shot close to his ear. Believing he had been
shot, Officer Hotard threw himself to the ground. Seeing Hotard hit
the ground, the other officers assumed Tyisha had shot Hotard. The
other officers began firing at Tyisha. Hotard too began firing.
Actually, Officer Paul Bugar had fired the first shot. Although he
couldn’t see the gun on Tyisha’s lap because of the shattered glass,
Officer Bugar said he fired because he saw Tyisha’s arm move and
thought she was reaching for her gun.135
It is not at all clear whether Tyisha Miller reached for her gun
and then fired at Officer Hotard or any other officer. Yet, Officer
Hotard heard a shot and assumed it was from Tyisha. Officer
Hotard linked the shot from his fellow officer’s gun with an
imagined shot from the semi-conscious, but nevertheless fearinspiring, nineteen-year-old Black teenager. Officer Hotard never
actually saw Tyisha reach for her gun. He heard a loud noise, which
he assumed was Tyisha shooting him.
The other officers,
responding to Hotard’s fear, assumed the young Black woman with
a gun had fired it at their colleague. This is why the initial police
explanation for the shooting was that Tyisha shot first. When the
evidence to support this claim did not turn up, the explanation
shifted and two officers began to claim they started shooting
because they saw Tyisha reach for her gun.
We will never know whether Tyisha Miller in fact reached for
her gun that night. Antonette Joiner, Tyisha’s cousin, who was
present throughout the entire shooting, claims Tyisha never
moved.136 However, Joiner was thirty feet away from the car and if
Tyisha was reclined in the driver’s seat, it would have been difficult
for Joiner to see movement below the driver’s side window. Tyisha
could have made a completely innocent move that the officers
interpreted as a move for her gun. Tyisha’s hair was cropped very
short at the time of the shooting, and the officers could have
mistaken her for a young Black man.
In some ways, it doesn’t really matter whether Tyisha reached
for her gun. The officers could have handled the situation with
more care and with an eye toward avoiding the use of deadly force.
The officers might have foreseen that shattering the driver’s side
window would startle an unconscious or sleeping person inside the
car. The officers had seen how the first unsuccessful attempt to
break the window had roused Tyisha. It is unfortunate that the
135. Id.
136. Lima & Pitchford, supra note 131.
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officers did not stop to consider other, less risky ways to handle the
situation. They might have asked if anyone from Tyisha’s family
had an extra set of car keys and could bring them to the gas station.
If they had done this, they would have learned that someone from
the family was already on the way. One wonders why the officers
did not attempt to use a coat hanger or other device to get into the
car without frightening Tyisha.
In May 1999, the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office
announced that no criminal charges would be filed against any of
the officers involved in the shooting death of Tyisha Miller.137 In
announcing the decision not to file charges, Riverside County
District Attorney Grover Trask said the officers made a “mistake in
judgment,” but were not criminally liable for their actions.138 Trask
also stated, “There is no evidence whatsoever that these four officers
killed Tyisha Miller because of her race.”139 The four officers
involved in the shooting were all fired on July 12, 1999.140
Compare the way San Diego police and California Highway
Patrol (CHP) officers handled a potentially dangerous situation
involving a White woman with a gun just six months after the
Tyisha Miller shooting. On July 1, 1999, at approximately 10:30 a.m.
in San Diego County, California, Janet Lucero, a fifty-eight-year-old
White woman, was in a long line of cars heading down Valley
Grade in Valley Center near Escondido.141 A truck in front of
Lucero was moving very slowly, forcing Lucero to repeatedly hit the
brakes on her 1983 Honda Civic coupe.142 Lucero tried to pass the
137. Jason W. Armstrong, Riverside Police Shooting Results in No Charges, L.A. DAILY J.,
May 7, 1999, at 1.
138. D.A. Clears Riverside Officers in Fatal Shooting of Black Woman, S.F. CHRON., May 7,
1999, at A7.
139. Id. While no one accused the four officers directly involved in the shooting of
making racial comments or jokes, another officer and a police supervisor reportedly
made racially insensitive remarks after the shooting, including some at the scene. One
officer referred to expressions of grief by family members at the scene as “the Watts
wail” and the supervisor commented that the gathering was like being at a Kwanzaa
celebration. Riverside Cops Probe Racial Remarks, Jokes, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 20,
1999, at 3B.
140. Sergeant at Fatal Shooting is Informed He’ll Be Fired, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
July 28, 1999, at A4.
141. Jeff McDonald, Standoff Snarls N. County, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 2, 1999, at
A1; Greg Moran, Woman Pleads Not Guilty in Chase, Standoff, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
July 8, 1999, at B1. It should be noted that Lucero's racial and ethnic identity is actually
ambiguous. Given her last name, Lucero could be Hispanic. In all of the news reports
that showed pictures of Lucero, however, Lucero appears to be white which is why the
author describes her as such. Attempts by the author to verify Lucero's racial and ethnic
identity were unsuccessful.
142. Alex Roth, Road Rage, Chase Detailed as Route 78 Trial Begins, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB., Mar. 14, 2000, at B1.
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truck, and in the process, cut in front of motorist Roberta Nielsen.143
The thirty-three-year-old Nielson followed Lucero until both cars
pulled into the parking lot of a Burger King in Escondido.144
Nielson got out of her car and walked to the driver’s side of
Lucero’s car to demand an explanation for Lucero’s almost causing
an accident.145 The women began shouting at each other with
Nielsen backing off only after Lucero pulled out a .38 caliber
revolver and pointed it at her.146 Nielsen then called police to report
the incident.
When Escondido police and CHP officers later caught up with
Lucero, she refused to obey police orders to surrender.147 Lucero
then led officers on a slow-speed chase down Interstate 15 to the
Kensington neighborhood of San Diego and then back up to the
North County.148 CHP officers tried to stop Lucero several times
with a spike strip, hoping to deflate her tires, but each time she
evaded the spiked strip.149 Once she even swerved towards the
officer laying the strip, but did not hit him.150
About noon, Lucero collided with a police car on Highway 78
in San Marcos.151 A bomb squad robot dispatched by the San Diego
County Sheriff’s Office to stand beside Lucero’s car confirmed that
Law enforcement officers surrounded
Lucero was armed.152
Lucero.153 From a safe distance behind their patrol cars and with
their guns drawn, the officers attempted to negotiate Lucero’s
surrender.154 Lucero, however, refused to leave her car.155 Because
Lucero came to a stop on a freeway which served to connect the two
most well-traveled north-south freeways in San Diego, traffic on
several major freeways was backed up and at a standstill for nearly
six hours.156 “At one point, Lucero lifted her handgun, without her
finger on the trigger, to show the officers that she was armed. After
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.; Alex Roth, Jury Mulls Case Involving Freeway Standoff, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB., Mar. 21, 2000, at B2.
147. McDonald, supra note 141.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Standoff After Freeway Chase Snarls North San Diego County Highway Traffic,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, July 1, 1999.
152. McDonald, supra note 141.
153. Id.
154. Alex Roth, Judge Rejects Request To Move Trial in Route 78 Standoff Case, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Feb. 8, 2000, at B2.
155. Moran, supra note 141.
156. McDonald, supra note 141.
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that, she alternately flashed her handgun at the officers, then laid it
on her lap, then gripped it with her finger on the trigger.”157 Finally,
Lucero came out of her car and walked towards authorities, first
with one hand in her front shorts pocket, then with both hands in
the air. She was then taken into custody.158
Lucero was charged with reckless driving, resisting arrest,
evading police, assault on a peace officer, and brandishing a
firearm.159 On March 13, 2000, Lucero went to trial. The jury
acquitted her of most of the criminal charges, but convicted her of
refusing to surrender to police, a felony offense, and fleeing police
during a chase, a misdemeanor. One juror expressed sympathy for
Lucero by describing her as “this little grandmother type.”160 The
judge was less sympathetic and sentenced Lucero to three years in
prison.161
It turns out that Lucero was not simply a kind, elderly woman
with a gun for self-protection. She had a history of threatening
behavior. In 1995, she used her handgun to threaten another
motorist in Ramona, California.162 Several months later, Lucero got
into an altercation with a CHP officer and threatened to “get a .357
Magnum and blow him away.”163 She had also threatened Ramona
court officials, warning them that she would come after them with a
.357 Magnum.164 Even though Lucero had driven her car toward an
officer laying a spike strip, endangering his life, then taunted
officers by flashing her gun at them with her finger on the trigger,
Lucero’s jury did not view her as a deadly threat. Black men and
women have been shot and killed for far less threatening behavior.
Because of the timing of the two incidents, it is difficult to know
whether the San Diego officers held their fire when dealing with
Janet Lucero because they did not want to receive the same kind of
criticism leveled at the Riverside officers who shot Tyisha Miller or
whether they held their fire because Lucero was a middle-aged
White woman with a gun as opposed to a young Black woman with
157. Id.
158. Id.; Moran, supra note 141; Alex Roth, Road Rage Before 78 Standoff Described, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 27, 1999, at B2; Alex Roth, Tape-Recorded Message From Lucero’s
Father Ended 78 Standoff, Witness Says, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 15, 2000, at B2; Alex
Roth, Woman in Long Route 78 Standoff is Ordered to Trial, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept.
1, 1999, at B2 [hereinafter Woman in Long Route 78 Standoff].
159. Moran, supra note 141.
160. Onell R. Soto, Woman in Standoff To Be Evaluated, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 9,
2000, at B1.
161. Alex Roth, Woman in ‘99 Standoff on Freeway Gets Prison, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Aug. 12, 2000, at B1.
162. Woman in Long Route 78 Standoff, supra note 158.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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a gun. At least some people thought Lucero was treated differently
because of her race. Recall that when Lucero came out of her car to
surrender, she had one hand in her pocket. The officers held their
fire rather than jumping to the conclusion that the hand in the
pocket was a hand ready to pull out the gun the officers knew
existed. Timothy Winters, a former San Diego police officer, now
pastor of the Bayview Baptist Church, commented, “Did you see her
put her hands in her pockets when she came out of the car? If [she]
had been an African American, she would not have just been gently
taken away. She would’ve either been ordered to hit the deck . . . or
the guns would’ve been blazing.”165
At one point during the standoff, Lucero leaned forward while
sitting in her car and reached down. An officer might have
interpreted this movement as Lucero reaching for the gun police
officers knew she had. Rather than jumping to the conclusion that
this forward and downward movement meant Lucero was reaching
for her gun, the officers held their fire long enough to see that
Lucero was merely rolling down the car window to get some air.
Had Lucero been Black and male, the officers might have handled
the situation quite differently.
For example, Aswon Watson, a Black man, reached down and
below the driver’s seat of his car while surrounded by Brooklyn
police officers, and was not as fortunate as Lucero. Unlike the
officers surrounding Lucero, who knew she had a gun, these officers
did not know whether Watson had a gun in his car. But when they
saw Watson lean forward, they assumed he was reaching for a gun
and quickly started firing into the car. It turns out they were wrong.
On June 13, 1996, undercover officers Keith Tierney and James
Gentile from the Brooklyn 67th Precinct’s anti-crime unit saw a
white Honda they thought had been carjacked.166 The officers
blocked the car with their unmarked patrol car and approached.167
Aswon Watson, a Black man, was in the driver’s seat of the car.
According to one witness, one of the officers shouted, “Freeze,
nigger. You’re dead!”168 Watson froze, both hands outstretched on
his car steering wheel.169 Another officer yelled at Watson to come

165. Gregory Alan Gross, Long Route 78 Standoff Still Rankles Some, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB., July 10, 1999, at B1.
166. Noel, supra note 55, at 42. Police later admitted that Watson owned the car,
which was registered under his name. Continued Protests Against Police Murder of Aswon
Watson, N.Y. BEACON, Sept. 4, 1996, at 3.
167. Peter Noel, Rough Justice: When Cops Get the Benefit of the Doubt, VILLAGE VOICE,
June 17, 1997, at 43.
168. Id.
169. Id.

DRAFT

3/4/05 12:12 PM

Fall 2004]

“BUT I THOUGHT HE HAD A GUN”

33

out of the car with his hands up.170 Instead, Watson started to reach
down and under the driver’s seat.171 The officers responded by
firing twenty-four rounds into Watson’s car.172 Eighteen of the
twenty-four bullets hit Watson, killing him.173
A subsequent investigation revealed that a car steering wheel
lock, not a gun, was under the driver’s seat.174 Nonetheless, a grand
jury found that the officers were justified in shooting Watson
because it was reasonable for the officers to believe their lives were in
danger.175

III. Internal and External Mechanisms To Hold Police
Accountable
Whenever police are accused of excessive force, there is a
natural tendency to defend their actions. Police officers have a
difficult job to perform and often encounter individuals who would
not hesitate to kill a cop if given a chance. Officers often must make
split-second decisions and even a moment’s hesitation can prove
fatal. It is nevertheless a tragedy when even one person is shot
because of a mistaken belief on the part of an officer that deadly
force was necessary to avoid imminent harm. When an officer
shoots and kills a suspect, someone who has not yet been tried or
convicted of a crime, that officer assumes the role of judge, jury, and
executioner without offering the suspect any of the protections
normally accorded through the criminal justice system. Officers are
entrusted with the power to use deadly force to enforce the law.
They should use this power sparingly and with an eye to causing
the least amount of harm.
It is imperative that we try to minimize the number of fatal
police shootings. The key to reducing the loss of life and injury
caused by police use of deadly force lies in changing police culture
so that officers see the protection of human life as a priority, even if
it means that a fleeing suspect may go free. It also means changing
societal attitudes towards policing so that television and movie
characters, such as the police officers in Dirty Harry176 and Lethal
Weapon177—cops who resort to force to resolve all conflicts—are not
thought of as good guys when they use excessive force.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Noel, supra note 55.
Id.
Id.
Played by Clint Eastwood.
Played by Mel Gibson and Danny Glover.
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Any solution to the problem must be multi-faceted. Reform has
to come both from within the police department as well as from
external forces. In addition, we need to educate our children about
the potentially tragic consequences of stereotyping. We also need to
talk amongst ourselves about stereotypes and police use of force,
and critically interrogate whether and when racialized fear is
“reasonable.” The first step towards reform involves recognition
that race can influence police officer decisions to use force.
A. Internal Mechanisms To Control Police Use of Force
A thorough analysis of all the available internal mechanisms to
control police use of force is beyond the scope of this essay and is
better addressed by one who has worked in law enforcement.
Therefore, I will just briefly mention a few important, but not
necessarily novel, ways in which police departments might seek to
minimize the use of deadly force against suspects of color and spend
the bulk of time discussing external mechanisms to control police
use of force.
Internally, police departments can work on at least three fronts
to control the use of force: recruitment, training, and discipline. In
recruiting new police officers, departments should conduct
thorough background investigations, paying careful attention to the
candidate’s propensity towards violence and racial bias.
Departments should also seek to diversify the workforce, increasing
the number of women and minority officers. Having more women
on the force is essential if we want to change the current culture
within police departments in which the use of force to control a
situation is taken as a given. Female officers are often able to
resolve conflicts just as effectively as male officers without resorting
to the use of force.178 Officers of color on the force can help bridge
the gap between residents of color in the community and the police
department and can serve as a reminder to White officers that racial
stereotyping of minorities is not appropriate. Increasing the number
of women and minorities in police departments, however, is
unlikely to significantly alter the fact that individuals of color are
disproportionately on the receiving end of police decisions to use
force because unconscious racism affects all of us, not just White
male officers. Some studies suggest that Black officers use force
178. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, REPORT
OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, at xiv

(1991) (noting that LAPD female officers appear to utilize a style of policing that
minimizes the use of excessive force as they are involved in use of excessive force at
rates substantially below those of male officers, while performing equally as well as their
male counterparts).
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against Black suspects as much as, if not more than, White
officers.179
Training in conflict resolution should be ongoing and should
focus on alternative ways to resolve conflicts on the street, not
simply on how to shoot a weapon. Ongoing and regular martial
arts training would be one way to build the officer’s self-confidence
and ability to remain calm in the face of danger. Officers trained in
the martial arts would learn to avoid situations of danger and use
deadly force only when absolutely necessary. Surprisingly, very
few police departments incorporate martial arts into their training
regime. Simulations and realistic role plays with follow-up one-onone conversations with a supervisory officer could be used to
prepare officers for confrontations on the street. Racial and cultural
sensitivity training should become an integral part of all training
sessions, rather than simply a separate one- or two-hour workshop.
In addition to careful recruitment and training of officers, police
departments must monitor and discipline errant officers.180 Clear
departmental guidelines on the use of force and early warning
systems should be adopted. Officers who violate departmental
policy should be sanctioned. In order to ensure enforcement of
departmental policy, the internal affairs division must be adequately
staffed. Additionally, short statutes of limitations should be
lengthened to enable sufficient time to investigate allegations of
misconduct.
B. External Mechanisms To Control Police Use of Force
Many external mechanisms for the control of police misuse of
force are already in place. These include criminal prosecution at the
federal and state levels, civil lawsuits, civilian review, and federal
pattern and practice investigations.
Additionally, many
jurisdictions have adopted community policing, increasing the level
of community involvement in directing police resources and the
interaction between officers and community residents. These
external mechanisms, however, are not problem-free.
1.

Criminal Prosecution
Criminal prosecution of law enforcement officers who misuse
force is one external method of controlling police misconduct.

179. See, e.g., JOEL H. GARNER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING THE USE OF FORCE BY AND
AGAINST THE POLICE IN SIX JURISDICTIONS 6-13 (2002); Geller & Karales, supra note 125, at
1853; Tim Roche & Brad Goldstein, Forcible Arrests Are Few, Records Show, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Dec. 23, 1996, at 1B (review of 1,011 use-of-force reports filed
by St. Petersburg, Florida police officers from June 1995 through September 1996).
180. CATHERINE H. MILTON ET AL., POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 139-41 (1977).
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However, this method of control is not terribly effective, because
prosecutions of law enforcement officers are rare and convictions
are even rarer. At the local level, district attorneys are often
reluctant to prosecute police officers suspected of excessive force
because such cases are difficult to win. It is easy for an officer to
say, “I shot him because he made a threatening move,” or “I fired
because I thought he had a gun.” There is also a credibility bias in
favor of police officers. Except in predominantly low-income
minority communities where residents may have experienced
problems with local law enforcement firsthand, jurors tend to
believe police officers over victims, particularly when the victim has
a criminal record or has been charged with a crime.181 The
unwritten code of silence provides another obstacle to successful
prosecution. Police officers who would otherwise be prosecution
eyewitnesses are often reluctant to testify against their fellow
officers. District attorneys may also be reluctant to file criminal
charges against an officer accused of excessive force because of “the
need to maintain good working relationships” with the officers in
the local police department.182 Prosecutors depend upon the
cooperation and helpful testimony of police officers to obtain
convictions in most of their cases. Police officers may view the filing
of criminal charges against their own as a breach of this close
working relationship and may be less than cooperative when
needed in other cases.
Federal prosecution of law enforcement officials is also rare.
Less than one percent of all complaints referred to the Department
of Justice, alleging civil rights violations by law enforcement
officers, lead to the filing of an indictment in federal court.183 In
large part, federal prosecution of law enforcement officers is rare
because federal prosecutors do not view themselves as the primary
overseers of police misconduct. As Assistant Attorney General John
Dunne once explained in testimony before Congress, “We are not
the ‘front-line’ troops in combating instances of police abuse. That
role properly lies with the internal affairs bureaus of law
enforcement agencies and with state and local prosecutors. The
federal enforcement program is more like a ‘back-stop’ to these
other resources.”184
While federal prosecutors may not have the same conflict of
181. Abraham L. Davis, The Rodney King Incident: Isolated Occurrence or a Continuation
of a Brutal Past?, 10 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 67, 68 (1993).
182. Mary M. Cheh, Are Lawsuits an Answer to Police Brutality?, in POLICE VIOLENCE:
UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE, supra note 125, at 247, 252.
183. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 14, at 90.
184. James P. Turner, Police Accountability in the Federal System, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV.
991, 1012 (1999).
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interest problems as their state counterparts (because federal
prosecutors generally do not rely upon the testimony of local police
officers to make or break their other cases), federal prosecutors, like
local district attorneys, do have to worry about credibility bias and
the code of silence. Additionally, federal prosecutors lack the
resources to prosecute every single case in which a law enforcement
officer uses excessive force against an individual.
The biggest obstacle to federal criminal prosecution of errant
officers, however, is the specific intent requirement. 18 U.S.C. § 242
punishes acts by anyone who, under color of law, “willfully”
subjects any person to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.185 In Screws v. United States, the Supreme Court
explained that it would be too easy to send a federal officer to the
penitentiary if all that were required was the general intent
normally required in criminal prosecutions.186 In order to remedy
this problem, the Court interpreted the word “willfully” in section
242 as requiring proof that the officer specifically intended to
deprive a person of his or her civil rights.187 Consequently, federal
prosecutors trying to convict a law enforcement officer who has
used excessive force against a civilian must prove not only that the
officer unlawfully intended to shoot or beat the individual, but also,
that in doing so, the officer had the specific intent to deprive the
victim of his or her civil rights. Federal prosecutors often decline to
bring charges against officers accused of excessive force because
they feel they cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
officer acted with the requisite specific intent to deprive the
individual of his or her civil rights. If Congress wanted to make it
easier for federal prosecutors to prosecute police misconduct cases,
it could pass legislation clarifying that the term “willfully” means
“intentionally” and does not require any further specific intent to
deprive an individual of his or her civil rights or it could amend 18
U.S.C. § 242 by replacing the word “willfully” with the word
“intentionally.”
2.

Civil Lawsuits
Another external method of checking police misuse of force is
the civil lawsuit. An individual harmed by a police officer who uses
excessive force (or a deceased individual’s estate) may sue the
officer, the police department, and the municipality188 in federal
185.
186.
187.
188.

18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000).
325 U.S. 91, 97 (1945).
Id. at 101.
Professor Mary Cheh points out that respondeat superior liability is not
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court, alleging federal civil rights violations.189 The individual may
also sue the officer in state court, alleging that the officer violated
the individual’s civil rights.
The problem with suing the individual officer is that an officer
may assert the defense of qualified immunity, which shields the
officer from civil liability.190 Under this defense, an officer “can
defend against liability for denial of a constitutional right by
showing he or she had an objectively reasonable good-faith belief
that his or her actions were lawful.”191 Mary Cheh argues that one
problem with the qualified immunity defense is that jurors often
think use of the words “good faith” means they must give the officer
the benefit of the doubt and let him off the hook as long as he
believed he was acting lawfully.192 Another problem with relying
upon the civil lawsuit as a means of controlling police use of force is
that the city or municipality typically ends up paying, either after a
judgment in the plaintiff’s favor or as a result of a settlement
agreement. When this happens, the city usually insists upon a
secret agreement with no admission of liability.193 Such secrecy does
little to encourage reform inside the police department.
Additionally, when the police department is not named as a
defendant in the suit, it may not even be aware that one of its
officers has been named in a lawsuit.194 The fact that a judgment has
recognized in section 1983 actions. Cheh, supra note 182, at 264. Liability can be
imposed on a municipality only if it “maintained a policy or custom that violated the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Id. at 265. Cheh argues that section 1983 should be
reformed to allow plaintiffs to sue municipalities under a respondeat superior theory.
Id. at 267.
189. See Carl B. Klockars, A Theory of Excessive Force and Its Control, in POLICE
VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE, supra note 125,
at 1, 4-6 (discussing possible civil actions against police for use of excessive force).
190. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (explaining that in a case in which an
officer claims qualified immunity, the initial inquiry is whether the facts alleged show
the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right and the second question is whether
this constitutional right was clearly established).
191. Cheh, supra note 182, at 264.
192. Id.
193. Dianne L. Martin, Organizing for Change: A Community Law Response to Police
Misconduct, 4 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 131, 155 (1993) (critiquing traditional legal
responses to police misconduct).
194. For example, the Los Angeles Police Department does not have a complete list of
officers who are current defendants in civil lawsuits nor does it have access to City
Attorney civil lawsuit records identifying such officers. The City Attorney’s Office
notifies the department of an officer’s involvement in a civil lawsuit only when an officer
has been named and served in a lawsuit and requests legal representation. However, if
the police officer is named but not formally served or if the officer requests legal
representation from the Police Protective League or obtains private counsel, the police
department may never become aware that a lawsuit naming the officer has been filed.
KATHERINE MADER, LOS ANGELES POLICE COMMISSION, STATUS UPDATE: MANAGEMENT
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been rendered against the officer (or that the city has paid the
plaintiff millions of dollars to settle the lawsuit) may not even be
noted in the officer’s personnel file. Thus, while the civil lawsuit
may benefit injured individuals and their families, it is not the most
effective way to effect systemic change in police departments.
3.

Civilian Review Boards
Another way to control police misconduct is through civilian
oversight. Civilian review has become fairly common over the last
twenty years. In 1980, only thirteen civilian review entities
existed.195 In 1994, that number had risen to sixty-six civilian review
bodies.196 Today, more than half of all major metropolitan U.S. cities
have adopted some form of civilian review.197
Civilian review can take many different forms, ranging from a
single ombudsman to a multi-member civilian review board.198
Some civilian review boards conduct their own independent
investigations, while others simply oversee internal police
investigations.199 A few review boards have the power to subpoena
witnesses and compel the production of documents.200 Others rely
upon the voluntary cooperation of witnesses. Some civilian review
bodies seek to ensure impartiality by prohibiting former police
officers from sitting on the board.201
One thing common to many civilian review bodies is the
inability to sanction law enforcement officers found to have engaged
in misconduct. Most civilian review boards have only the power to
recommend to the police chief or the police commission that an errant
officer be disciplined.202 The police chief or the police commission
OF LAPD

HIGH-RISK OFFICERS 5 (1997) (noting that the City Attorney’s Office would not
provide the Office of the Inspector General with either the names of officers involved in
ongoing civil lawsuits or the names of officers involved in settled civil lawsuits).
195. SAMUEL WALKER, CITIZEN REVIEW RESOURCE MANUAL 3 (1995).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 5. See also CITIZENS AGAINST POLICE ABUSE, A CIVILIAN REVIEW BOARD:
CREATING TRUST AND ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH CITIZEN MONITORING OF POLICE
ACTIVITIES, available at http://www.louisvillepeace.org/CAPA/civilian_review.html
(last visited Dec. 15, 2004) (“According to the American Civil Liberties Union or ACLU,
already more than 60 percent of this nation’s 50 largest cities have some type of civilian
review system in place.”).
198. “Of the 66 citizen review bodies that existed in 1995, 54 (82 percent) involved a
multimember board, and 11 (17 percent) were agencies with a single director.” Id. at 7.
199. Id. at 8-9.
200. Id. at 13.
201. The Office of Citizen Complaints in San Francisco, California, for example, is
staffed by civilians who have never been police officers in San Francisco. For more
information
on
San
Francisco’s
Office
of
Citizen
Complaints,
see
http://www.ci.sf.ca.us/occ (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
202. Telephone Interview with Phil Eure, Executive Director, Office of Citizen
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has final authority over what, if any, discipline shall be imposed.
Clearly, such limited power reduces the effectiveness of civilian
review as a means of controlling police misconduct.
It is important to recognize that civilian review, if inadequately
funded and dependent upon political forces, can be used to appease
public demands for police accountability without providing a
meaningful check on police. For example, one city set up a civilian
review board after voters demanded one.203 For the first few years,
the board aggressively investigated officers who had complaints
lodged against them. The board litigated and won the right to
subpoena accused officers and compel their testimony.
Then the good work started to unravel. A politically savvy
individual was elected to head the law enforcement agency in
question. This person was close to the politicians running city
government. These politicians had the power to appoint and
remove members of the civilian review board. Suddenly, members
of the board who had been instrumental in leading the fight to
compel officer testimony were let go. The composition of the board
began to change. Soon, six of the eleven members, including the
Executive Director, had law enforcement or military backgrounds or
close family connections to law enforcement. The newly constituted
board then entered into an agreement with the law enforcement
agency it was supposed to monitor, giving up the right to compel
officers to testify (a right won at the State Supreme Court level). The
new board agreed to allow personnel from the law enforcement
agency to conduct interviews on specific allegations of misconduct
with minimal input from the civilian review board. Under this
agreement, civilian review board members were allowed to attend
the interviews but were not allowed to ask any direct questions of
the officers under investigation. As a result of these changes, none
of the sixty-three complaints filed by citizens against law
enforcement officers in this particular jurisdiction in 1998 were
sustained.
4.

Federal Pattern and Practice Investigations
The beating of Rodney King prompted Congress to think about
other ways to check police misconduct. Prior to 1994, federal
prosecutors could bring criminal charges only against an individual
Complaint Review (OCCR) in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 9, 2004). The OCCR is an
independent District of Columbia government agency which reviews and resolves
complaints of misconduct filed by citizens against Metropolitan Police Department
officers. Unlike other civilian review boards, the OCCR has the ability to make binding
recommendations to the Chief of Police.
203. The following information comes from a confidential conversation with a former
member of this civilian review board.
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officer who used excessive force, not against the law enforcement
agency that employed the officer.204 As noted above, federal
criminal prosecutions were (and still are) rare because of the specific
intent requirement and lack of sufficient resources. In 1994,
Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994. This Act gave the Department of Justice the authority
to investigate and prosecute city governments and police
departments engaged in a pattern or practice of civil rights
violations.205
In 1996, the Department of Justice exercised its new authority
by conducting a pattern and practice investigation of the police
department in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
This investigation
culminated in a forty-page consent decree between the Department
of Justice and the Pittsburgh Police Department.206
The decree was approved by a federal court in April 1997.207
Although the Pittsburgh Police Department denied any and all
allegations regarding inadequate training, supervision, and
discipline, it agreed, among other things, to develop a use-of-force
policy in accordance with applicable laws, establish an earlywarning system,208 conduct regular audits of situations involving
possible racial bias, appoint an independent auditor to enforce the
consent decree, and require officers to file use-of-force reports.209
In August 1997, the Justice Department concluded its second
pattern and practice investigation by entering into a consent decree
with the city of Steubenville, Ohio, and its police force. Under this
consent decree, the Steubenville Police Department agreed to
improve training, implement use-of-force guidelines, create an
internal affairs division, and establish an early warning system.210
The Department of Justice has conducted and is currently
204. See Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on
Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 816 (1999).
205. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2000); see also Livingston, supra note 204, at 815-16.
206. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 14, at 103-04.
207. Id.
208. Samuel Walker explains that:
An early warning system is a data-based police management tool designed to
identify officers whose behavior is problematic and provide a form of
intervention to correct that performance. As an early response, a department
intervenes before such an officer is in a situation that warrants formal
disciplinary action. The system alerts the department to these individuals and
warns the officers while providing counseling or training to help them change
their problematic behavior.
Samuel Walker et al., Early Warning Systems: Responding to the Problem Officer, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN BRIEF, July 2001, at 1.
209. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 14, at 103-04.
210. Id. at 104-105.
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conducting several other pattern and practice investigations. Its
recent investigations have resulted in consent decrees involving the
Los Angeles Police Department and the State Police of New Jersey
as well as Memoranda of Understanding with the police
departments in Montgomery County, Maryland, and the
Metropolitan Police Department in the District of Columbia.211
5.

Federal Data Collection on Police Use of Force
In another attempt to address the problem of excessive force by
police, Congress passed the Police Accountability Act, which was
incorporated into the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994.212 The Police Accountability Act directed the Attorney
General to collect data on the use of excessive force by law
enforcement officers throughout the nation and to publish an annual
summary of this data.213 Even though the Act was passed in 1994, it
appears that not one of the attorneys general in office since then has
issued an annual report.214
Even if Congress provides additional funds to enable the
Attorney General to collect and analyze data on police excessive
force, any information collected is likely to be incomplete. The Act
does not require local law enforcement agencies to keep records on
the use of force nor does it require such agencies to submit use-offorce data to the Attorney General. Federal data collection depends
upon the voluntary cooperation of local law enforcement agencies.
As long as some law enforcement agencies do not cooperate, any
data that is collected will present an incomplete and inaccurate
picture of police use of force.
6.

Community Policing
Recently, support for the concept of “community policing” has
become popular.215
However, before jumping to embrace
211. See Holly James McMickle, Letting DOJ Lead the Way: Why DOJ’s Pattern or
Practice Authority is the Most Effective Tool To Control Racial Profiling, 13 GEO. MASON U.
CIV. RTS. L.J. 311, 325-33 (2003).
212. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 § 210402, 42 U.S.C. §
14142 (1995).
213. Id.
214. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 14, at 108 (noting that nearly four years after
passage of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the Justice
Department was still trying to fulfill its mandate and no annual report had been
produced because of insufficient funding). A recent search for such an annual report
was also unsuccessful.
215. See, e.g., Susan M. Hartnett & Wesley G. Skogan, Community Policing: Chicago’s
Experience, NAT’L INST. JUST. J., Apr. 1999, at 3; Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the
Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 551 (1997); Deborah A. Ramirez et al., Rethinking the Culture of Professional
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community policing, it is important to note that the concept means
different things to different people. Typically, community policing
means increased interaction between police and the community.
Under this model, police officers and residents of a community meet
on a regular basis. Residents are encouraged to give the police input
regarding the community’s concerns and the matters they think
need priority police attention. Police officers assigned to the
neighborhood try to resolve the top priority concerns of the
community, even if these concerns are not strictly within the police
department’s jurisdiction. If, for example, community residents are
concerned about slum landlords and abandoned buildings as sites
for criminal activity, police work with housing authorities and other
city agencies to address these problems. Increased interaction
between police officers and residents breaks down barriers, helping
officers to see residents of a community as richly diverse
individuals, not simply criminal suspects. It also helps residents see
police officers in a more positive light.
In Chicago, for example, the city and the police department
worked together to initiate an experiment in community policing in
April 1993 called the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy.216
During its initial experimental phase, patrol officers were assigned
to fixed beats and trained in problem-solving strategies.217
Neighborhood meetings between police and community residents
were held on a monthly basis and citizen committees were formed
Chicago’s
to advise police regarding residents’ concerns.218
experiment in community policing has resulted in better policecommunity relations and a drop in crime.219 San Diego and Boston
have also experimented with this model of community policing.220
Others define community policing quite differently. James Q.
Wilson and George Kelling, conservative scholars who developed
the “broken windows” theory,221 describe community policing as a
Policing: Democratic Theory, Police Integrity and a Service-Oriented Community Justice
Model of Law Enforcement (Sept. 23, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (discussing Boston’s model of professional policing).
216. Hartnett & Skogan, supra note 215, at 3-11.
217. Id. at 9.
218. Id. at 5-6.
219. Id. at 5.
220. Ramirez et al., supra note 215.
221. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Mar. 1982, at 29. Wilson and Kelling theorized that if a window in a building is broken
and left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken. One unrepaired
window is a sign that no one cares, and that breaking windows will not result in
punishment. Id. at 31. Serious crime flourishes in neighborhoods where disorderly
Id. at 34.
behavior, e.g. panhandling, graffiti, drunkenness, goes unchecked.
Accordingly, police officers should be given wide discretion to crack down on minor
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policy that focuses upon maintaining order on the streets.222 Under
Wilson and Kelling’s model, officers take a zero-tolerance approach
to crime, arresting people for littering, jaywalking, and other minor
offenses.223 Order maintenance is the main focus of this model of
policing.224 Tracey Meares and Dan Kahan call this model of
community policing the “new community policing.”225
Former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani embraced
Wilson and Kelling’s broken windows theory and this model of
community policing. When he took office in 1994, Giuliani ordered
the New York Police Department to aggressively enforce minor
violations of the law, such as jaywalking, vagrancy, and public
intoxication. New York City experienced a major drop in crime,
which many attributed to Giuliani’s get-tough approach.226
Giuliani’s zero-tolerance policing policy, however, also brought
about a marked increase in the number of complaints filed by racial
and ethnic minorities against the police.227
C. Beyond the Traditional Methods of Controlling Police Force
Beyond the traditional methods of controlling police use of
force, what else can be done to minimize the loss of life and limb
that comes from police decisions to pull the trigger, particularly
when those decisions are influenced by racial stereotypes? One
possibility is to put ourselves in the shoes of the victim when
evaluating the reasonableness of police decisions to use deadly
force. Film director Desmond Nakano attempts to do this in a film
entitled White Man’s Burden. John Travolta plays Louis Pinnock, a
poor White man struggling to survive in a society where Blacks
occupy most, if not all, of the positions of power and prestige.
offenses and behavior that may not even be criminal. Id. at 35.
222. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Making Neighborhoods Safe, THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Feb. 1989, at 46.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal
Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1160-61 (1998) (arguing that strict enforcement of curfew
laws, anti-loitering laws, and laws against aggressive panhandling, public drunkenness,
vandalism, and other forms of public disorder constitute elements of the “new
community policing”); cf. David Cole, Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination
Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059 (1999).
226. KHALED TAQI-EDDIN & DAN MACALLAIR, CENTER ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, SHATTERING “BROKEN WINDOWS”: AN ANALYSIS OF SAN FRANCISCO’S
ALTERNATIVE CRIME POLICIES (1999), http://www.cjcj.org/pubs/windows/
windows.html. San Francisco, which has adopted policing strategies quite different
from New York’s policing strategies, has registered reductions in crime that equal or
exceed New York’s reductions in crime. Id.
227. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 75.
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Whites in this made-up society work as housemaids, butlers,
gardeners, and blue-collar workers, while Blacks are doctors,
lawyers, executives, and managers. Travolta is fired from his
factory job after he makes a delivery to the home of the factory
owner, a Black man played by Harry Belafonte, who mistakenly
thinks Travolta is peeping at his wife while she is wrapped in a
towel after coming out of the shower. Travolta is unable to secure
another good job, and, in desperation, kidnaps Belafonte to teach
him a lesson about powerlessness.
At the end of the movie, Belafonte becomes very ill. Travolta
tries to take him to the hospital, but his truck breaks down. He then
tries to flag down a passing motorist to no avail. Travolta knows
that since they are in a predominantly White, low-income, and high
crime neighborhood, the police, who are predominantly Black, will
not come into the neighborhood unless they think a crime has been
committed. Travolta shoots out the windows of a nearby car and
store, hoping that the resulting alarms will summon the police.
When police officers arrive, they see the Black man on the ground
with Travolta, obviously distraught, standing next to him. The
officers yell at Travolta to put his hands in the air. Travolta, still
holding his gun, begins to put his hands in the air. The Black
officers see the gun in Travolta’s hand and assume Travolta is about
to shoot them. Responding to this imaginary threat, the officers
shoot and kill Travolta.
Nakano’s film illustrates the unfairness of assuming a person’s
dangerousness based upon his race, gender, and class. By switching
the racial hierarchy in current society and creating a hypothetical
society in which Whites are viewed as poor, immoral,
untrustworthy, and violent, Nakano attempts to reach White
viewers in the audience who might not think that a real-life police
shooting of a Black person, a Latino, or some other person of color is
unjust, but will understand the police shooting of a White man,
clearly motivated by the Black police officers’ racial bias, as an
unjust action. Because the switching of the races is explicit, viewers
are encouraged to come to the conclusion that it is wrong to judge a
person, any person, by his or her appearance.
Race-switching through role reversal training might be used to
teach police officers how wrong-headed it is to rely on racial
stereotypes, but for reasons explained below, I have doubts about
whether such an experiment would succeed. For example, White
recruits could be subjected to a week-long training in which Black
officers treat them as presumptively criminal. On April 20, 1999,
Leonard Manzella tried an experiment of this sort on thirteen cadets
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from the San Luis Obispo Juvenile Services Center in California.228
Manzella used the technique of role reversal to create an
environment in which officer cadets would experience being
incarcerated to encourage empathy for the incarcerated juveniles
they would soon be supervising. Manzella’s experiential training
program was designed to give the recruits not simply a cognitive
understanding of what it is like to be a minor in custody, but an
emotional understanding as well. Manzella enlisted three men to
role-play three distinct types of officers so the cadets could
experience different styles of communication. One man played an
aggressive, angry officer who wouldn’t listen to anyone else and
believed his role was to punish. A second individual played the role
of a passive officer, a nice guy who wanted to avoid trouble at all
costs and simply put in his hours and leave. The third individual
played a strong yet mature and compassionate officer. The cadets
experienced feelings of resentment towards the first officer and
found themselves refusing to comply with even his reasonable
requests because they did not like his personality. They found the
second officer ineffective, and did not respect him. The cadets
responded best to the third officer.
Although role reversal seemed to be an effective learning
technique in Manzella’s experiment, I have doubts that race-based
role reversal training would have similar positive effects. Manzella
was able to create a realistic environment with the types of authority
figures he used. Law enforcement officers who are ineffective
because they are too authoritarian really do exist. Correctional
officers who are too nice also exist. In contrast, there is no pervasive
White-as-Criminal stereotype in this society. Temporarily placing a
White person in a situation in which he or she is treated as a
criminal presumably because of his or her race would not be
realistic and therefore might not have any lasting effect.
I have suggested elsewhere that another possible reform
involves race-switching at the jury deliberation level.229 In cases in
which racial stereotypes may have influenced the police officer’s
decision to shoot, racial stereotypes may also influence the jury’s
decision as to whether to acquit the officer on the ground of selfdefense. In such cases, the prosecutor might request or the judge
might decide sua sponte to issue a jury instruction that reminds
jurors of the impropriety of relying on racial stereotypes. The
instruction could advise:

228. See WALK THE TALK: A LESSON IN EMPATHY (1999) (a documentary by Leonard
Manzella).
229. Lee, supra note 47, at 482.
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It is natural to make assumptions about the parties and witnesses
in any case based on stereotypes. Stereotypes constitute welllearned sets of associations or expectations correlating particular
traits with members of a particular social group. You should try
not to make assumptions about the parties and witnesses based
on their membership in a particular racial group.
If you are unsure about whether you have made any unfair
assessments based on racial stereotypes, you may engage in a
race-switching exercise to test whether stereotypes have colored
your evaluation of the case before you. Race-switching involves
imagining the same events, the same circumstances, the same
people, but switching the races of the parties. For example, if the
officer defendant is White and the victim is Black, you could
imagine a Black officer and a White victim. If your evaluation of
the case before you is different after engaging in race-switching,
this may suggest a subconscious reliance on racial stereotypes.
You may then wish to reevaluate the case from a neutral,
unbiased perspective.230

There is reason to be hopeful that a race-switching jury
instruction might have a positive effect on a jury in a case in which
race is an issue. Social scientists have found that making race salient
encourages egalitarian-minded individuals to suppress their
otherwise automatic stereotype-driven responses.231 In one study,
for example, Patricia Devine asked White subjects to list all the
labels they were aware of for Black Americans, flattering or
negative.232 Devine found that low-prejudiced subjects listed
positive attributes consistent with egalitarian principles and highprejudiced subjects listed negative traits consistent with stereotypes
about Black Americans.233 Devine concluded that when race is
made salient to low-prejudiced persons, they will inhibit their
negative stereotype-congruent responses and replace them with
non-prejudiced thoughts.234
Moreover, race-switching has been employed successfully in an
actual criminal case. In the late 1990s, criminal defense attorney Jim
McComas was representing a young Black male teenager in Alaska
charged with aggravated assault against a White male classmate.
230. Id.
231. Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled
Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1989); see also Samuel L. Gaertner &
John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND
RACISM 61, 73-86 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986); Jody Armour,
Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L.
REV. 733 (1995).
232. Devine, supra note 231.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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McComas was afraid that he would get a mostly White jury, which
would see his client as the aggressor and disbelieve his client’s claim
of self-defense because of his race. After reading my 1996 Minnesota
Law Review article on race and self-defense, in which I first proposed
a race-switching jury instruction, McComas asked the judge for a
race-switching jury instruction. The judge required the jury to raceswitch and they came back with a verdict of not guilty.235 Even if
race-switching jury instructions do not deter police officers from
using deadly force in response to subconscious racial bias, they can
serve the useful purpose of expressing the law’s condemnation of
racial bias in police decision-making.236
One possible objection to this proposal is that it is unfair to hold
the officer liable when even ordinary citizens would have believed
the minority victim posed an imminent threat of death or serious
bodily injury. In other words, my proposal appears to hold the
officer to a higher standard than what we would require of ordinary
citizens. We, however, already hold law enforcement officers to a
higher standard than that required of ordinary citizens. A law
enforcement officer is generally held to the standard of the
reasonably well-trained law enforcement officer, not the reasonable
lay person.237 Moreover, it only seems fair to increase the scrutiny of
actions which take a human life.
Conclusion
As this essay has attempted to show, officers who use deadly
force rarely suffer criminal liability for their actions. An officer’s
explanation that he believed the victim posed a serious threat of
death or serious bodily injury to the officer or others is usually
accepted by judges and jurors not only as a sincere belief, but also as
one that is reasonable. Although I have focused on race in this
essay, this problem affects not just racial minorities, but also the
poor (particularly the homeless) and the mentally ill. Unfortunately,
as long as racial minorities, poor people, and individuals with
mental problems constitute the bulk of the victims of police
shootings, few people outside of these disenfranchised populations
will feel motivated to do something to control police use of deadly
force. Often, it is only when people feel that one of their own has
235. James McComas & Cynthia Strout, Combating the Effects of Racial Stereotyping in
Criminal Cases, THE CHAMPION, Aug. 1999, at 22, 24.
236. See Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515
(2000) (discussing the expressive function of law).
237. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984).

DRAFT

Fall 2004]

3/4/05 12:12 PM

“BUT I THOUGHT HE HAD A GUN”

49

been unfairly victimized that they are motivated to take action.
Take, for example, the August 1999 police shooting of Gidone
Busch, a mentally disturbed Jewish man who was shot and killed by
police officers in Brooklyn, New York. Unlike many police
shootings that occur without any civilian witnesses, this police
shooting was witnessed by a number of people who were out on the
street that night.
August 30, 1999. 6:40 p.m. Brooklyn, New York. Police officers
responded to a 911 call reporting a man with a hammer at 1619
46th Street, acting strangely. Officers Daniel Gravitch and
Martin Sanablin were the first officers on the scene. From the
sidewalk, they looked down a narrow flight of stairs and saw
Gidone Busch, a tall thin man, inside a basement apartment,
wearing a towel-like prayer shawl on his left arm and head. Busch
was holding a claw hammer flat in both his hands as if holding the
handle of a shopping cart. When Busch refused the officers’ orders
to put the hammer down, the officers called for back-up and the
Emergency Service Unit (a special team trained to handle
mentally disturbed individuals). At 6:46 p.m., Sergeant Terrence
O’Brien and Officer Kieran O’Leary arrived, followed by Sergeant
Joseph Memoly and Officer William Loshiavo at 6:47 p.m.
Busch stepped out of the basement apartment into a small landing
at the foot of the stairs and rapped his hammer on the bricks. One
officer pulled out a can of pepper spray. Busch started running up
the stairs, screaming and shouting, “Get out of my way,” while
swinging the hammer left and right. His hammer hit some of the
officers on their toes and legs. When he got to the top of the stairs,
Busch rushed past the officers into the street. About ten feet later,
Busch ran into a brick wall. He turned to face the officers who
had followed him. The officers, with their guns drawn, made a
semi-circle around Busch and shouted, “Drop the hammer!”
Suddenly, the officers began shooting. All twelve shots hit and
killed Busch.238
Initially, the police officers explained that they shot Busch
because he was in the process of beating a police sergeant with his
hammer and had to be stopped to save the sergeant’s life.239
Eyewitness testimony, the pattern of shell casings, and the position
of Busch’s body, however, contradicted this account of the
shooting.240 The police continued to insist that the shooting was
justified.
Prior to this shooting incident, the predominantly Hasidic
238. Narrative derived from John Kifner, Police Account Challenged in Killing of
Troubled Man, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1999, at A1.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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community, of which Busch was a member, had been strong
supporters of both the New York Police Department and former
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. Eighty-eight percent of the voters in this
community had voted for Giuliani in the election preceding the
shooting.241 They supported the mayor and the police department
despite numerous police shootings of unarmed Black and Latino
men.
The shooting of Busch changed this sentiment. One resident of
the community remarked, “I didn’t feel [the police officers] were in
danger. . . . If I felt any danger, I wouldn’t have been standing
there.”242 Another eyewitness told reporters, “The police murdered
him. They killed him in cold blood. In my opinion, he did not
threaten five or six policemen. He wasn’t lunging at them.”243
Interestingly, stereotypes about Blacks came into play even though
the shooting was directed at a mentally ill Jewish man. Suggesting
that the shooting might have been justified had the victim been a
Black man with a build like O.J. Simpson’s, one resident of the
community expressed her criticism of the police in the following
way:
[Busch’s] been acting a little nutty. So what—you kill a man
because he’s acting a little nutty? [The police] exaggerate, make
him sound like some six-four O.J. Simpson. He’s a very skinny
guy; he looked like he hadn’t eaten in years.244

Not surprisingly, the tremendous outrage against the police
action in this case did not extend much beyond the Hasidic
community that felt closest to the mentally disturbed victim.
As long as police misuse of force is seen as a problem that
mainly affects Blacks, Latinos, other minorities, the poor, and the
mentally ill, the police will have no incentive to be more careful
when using their weapons. If White men constituted sixty percent
to eighty-five percent of the victims of police shootings, the public
outcry would likely lead to quick reform in police departments
across the nation. Of course, I do not suggest that police should go
out and shoot more Caucasians. More police violence is not the
answer. Instead, more attention should be paid to the racial
meaning of police use of force. Whenever a police officer uses force,
particularly deadly force, against a person of color, society should
critically interrogate the racial meaning of the officer’s claim that he
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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acted reasonably in self-defense. One way of encouraging such
critical inquiry is by instructing jurors to engage in race-switching.
Jurors might be encouraged to switch the races of the defendant and
the victim whenever there is reason to believe racial stereotypes
may be influencing their deliberative processes. Making race salient
has been shown in other contexts to encourage egalitarian-minded
individuals to suppress otherwise automatic stereotype-driven
responses. As Jim McComas’s case suggests, there is reason to be
hopeful that making race salient in the jury room can have similar
positive results. The time has come for us as a society to critically
examine the often used, but never condoling excuse, “but I thought
he had a gun.”

